


INTELLECTUAL RELIGION

THOMAS CURRAN RYAN


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INTELLECTUAL RELIGION

BY

THOMAS CURRAN RYAN

OF THE WISCONSIN BAR



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

By "Intellectual Religion" I mean Religion; just as, when I say, "It is a sunny day," I mean Day. The day is no less day because sunny, nor is Religion less if intellectual. Intellect and the religious intuition are in accord with each other. Indeed all intuitions are profitless unless supplemented by Intellect. The babe with equal avidity stuffs a pebble and a berry into its mouth until experience, manifesting itself through intellect, tells it which of the two is food. So it is with religious truth.

We must begin with a definition. What is Religion? I define it as the effort of man to do God's will, including, as a matter of course, all attempts to ascertain His will, and, therefore, all ideas of God, because from our conceptions of His character must come our inferences of what He wants us to do.

Several causes, set forth in the following chapters, have forced upon me an intellectual conviction of God. This belief, which men have arrived at in different ways—through suggestion, through intuition, and occasion-

ally through their reasoning powers—is of slight human interest, standing alone; it has never been alone, however, but always joined with the great question of our obligations to God; and as Evolution is His universal way, our conception of His Will, i.e., our Religion, has, like other phenomena, undergone evolutionary changes, and will continue to change for the better. This means, I think, that it will become more and more in accord with the teaching of the great Savior of Religion, in His parable of The Sower:—"That seed which was sown upon good ground, this is he that heareth the word, *and understandeth it.*" In other words, Religion and Philosophy should continue their present strong tendency to merge into each other.

One of my earliest and most vivid memories of pioneer life concerns an aged "Thompsonian" doctor who was in demand as a lecturer. His lectures, whatever the subject, began with the creation of the world, and a history of the principal events that happened upon it afterward. This conceit was once somewhat prevalent in local histories and biographies and is caricatured in the opening chapters of "Tristram Shandy," and "Knickerbocker's History of New York." Something of the same vogue obtained with the older philosophers—a predilection to give with each new message an

elaborate compendium of all that had been said before. In our strenuous time this must not be done. Whoso desires to learn the Past can explore its burial places. If we have a message that, wisely or unwisely, we think to be new and worth hearing, we ought to give with it no more than is necessary of what can be read elsewhere.

The discerning reader of to-day is not so much attracted by a book that offers to save him the trouble of thinking, as by one that compels thought. Nor does he expect the "riddle of the universe" to be solved for him. He has come to realize that the universe of matter, life and mind, is a product of evolution, constantly changing, so that its solution would mean not only exposition of what is and has been, but prophecy of all that shall ever be. Solving the riddle of the universe has been the amusement of many philosophers in past ages. But however satisfactory the results of such efforts may have been to these men, it has been found that by the time the solution was furnished, the universe was asking new questions not dreamed of in their philosophies. Comte is a conspicuous example. The world had outgrown his philosophy before he completed his work. And afterward he remained in that old universe steadfastly refusing to recognize "the new heaven and new earth" which had grown

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into form while he was buried in his study under the leaves of his manuscript: that new heaven and earth which are every day being born into human consciousness, as truth takes the place of error.

"First Cause" is a finite term, applicable only to secondary causes by which finite forms, movements or processes are initiated. Cause, Law, Time, Space, Inertia, Matter, Force, Life, Mind, Will and all the potentialities of Identity and Difference are *Eternal* Realities; hence the finite qualification "first" cannot properly be applied to any of them.

Philosophy must reckon with the possibility that, besides Cause, the Cosmos may contain that which is non-causative, whose sole property is mere dead resistance to Cause. True philosophy must begin with the scientific spirit of questioning observed facts as to their meaning. It should not assume in the first place a theory and then rake the universe for proofs that may be bent into accord with a preconception. This is the reverse of the scientific method. Idealism is forced, by its assumed premise of a monistic universe, to say that "God is the author of evil."¹ But this is Dualism. It is God with two opposed natures, warring against Himself, creating evil and then banishing it. Potential Evil is necessary in

¹ John Fiske's "Through Nature to God," page 38.

the world, for without it Good would be impossible; but actual evil is worse than useless and we must seek its explanation along some untried pathway of inquiry. Dead, impotent Eternal Realities, such as Time, Space and Inertia, though powerless to cause any phenomenon whatever, must resist Cause during any process of causation, and this unavoidable resistance could be manifested only as Evil. Cause is limited to the Possible.

The boundary between Science and Philosophy is not sharply defined; yet in a general way it may be said that the former deals with observed facts and the latter with attempts to reason into facts a meaning which they do not directly disclose. To the evolution of Mind, a lesson learned is useful only as it helpfully leads us to an unlearned one; hence, unless we stand still, we must have our philosophies to explain our facts. To know facts is to be learned, but to know their meaning is wisdom; therefore to search for their meaning is to seek wisdom. As we study the phenomena of Life, Mind, and Matter, let us follow the good advice of Thomas Huxley, "Sit down before a fact like a little child and be prepared to follow humbly wheresoever it may lead;" so shall we be brought to the best of all faiths, the faith of understanding.

I submit a "creed" that every one will sub-



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scribe to, and which would be more honored than it is, in observance and in spirit, if the shadows of facts had no power to frighten us:—Be not afraid of Truth. Vex not the mind with fear that facts may subvert law. Be vigilant to know. Be skeptical concerning narrations that transcend human knowledge and experience. Take pains not to be deceived into accepting falsehood as truth. But when a fact is proved, let the source of its discovery or revealment be what it may—this investigator or that one, a religious revival or Psychological Research—never mind its rarity, its strangeness, or that it seems inexplicable. Stand before it with uncovered head. It is the Word of God.

Personal experience compels me to sympathize with all who not having “the light of Faith” yet seek it, and are so constituted, or trained, that their search must be guided by reason. They comprise a numerous, varied and goodly company of vedettes upon the farthest hills, watching for the dawn of a better religious Day. God only helps those who cannot help themselves. He imparts truth which we are unable to obtain ourselves. Those who possess or can acquire the power to find it must bestir themselves. The door is not opened to them otherwise. No intuition manifested in sudden conversion or change of heart relieves their suspense. But they have an exalted mis-

sion in the divine Father's scheme of Evolution. To them shall be accorded the glory of proclaiming that all-inclusive Christian Philosophy of the future the first dawn of which already lights the summits. It will bring to the world *knowledge* of God and what He wants us to do. It will make science and reason the useful and willing servants of religion. It will convince the intellect. The Christian graces of Faith, Hope and Love shall flourish as never before. The Sower shall go forth to sow, and the seed will no longer fall upon rocks and barren places nor among thistles, but in the good soil of understanding.

CHAPTER II

FINITE AND INFINITE IN THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE

Nature gives up her secrets to the patient inquirer; but there are mysteries that do not belong to her, that lie beyond her, to which she has no key. Nature began with Evolution, and Evolution with first forms. Material and ideal forms may all be included in a comprehensive conception of Nature. This is only choosing a name, and as words cannot mislead when fully defined I shall use this term, "Nature," as including all forms—things and thoughts, the realm of the Finite.

Only by these finite lights can we know that which is infinite. They are ample for the purpose. It is inconceivable that the substance of any material form should differ from the infinite or infinites out of which it came, that infinite Space should be unlike the finite spaces we are acquainted with, that Time and any period of it should not be alike, or that Mind, Life or Spirit, considered as infinites, should not be the same in essence as the finite forms derived from them. We

“Hold infinity in the palm of our hand,
And Eternity in an hour.”

The Infinite is the only noumenon; it is like the finite, which was once a part of it. We can know it in the Material Universe only through the finite; nor do we need to, since during all eternity we can never meet with it.

We are accustomed to hear that which is spatially infinite spoken of as infinitely superior in all respects to the finite. But if we look about us in Material Nature, we see active energy directed to the segregation of portions of the Infinite, and changing these portions into more or less durable forms. Infinity has no form, because form means outline, and outline means the Finite. The infinite mass of matter is dead, futile, inefficient. When a part becomes separated from it, then, and not until then, is the beginning of evolution. All that lives, all that contributes to life, all that is governed by Law, all that is endowed with Mind is finite *in bulk*.

As to infinite matter no economy is needed, since it can never by any process be increased or diminished. The infinite energies stored within it must ever remain dormant, for radiant energy means motion, motion of anything means room outside of itself in which to move, and the Infinite leaves no space outside of it-

self. "When I lift my hand I move the stars in Ursa Major," said a popular preacher. Possibly. But, granting that by moving his hand he disturbed the equilibrium in Ursa Major, he did a more wonderful thing in moving his hand, for he thereby imparted motion and direction to the inert matter of his physical body, through his mental energy—his will power. However far this movement of his body might, through the law of gravitation, extend to other regions of space, neither that nor any other finite motion, however great, could affect Infinity. Upon the outer confines of our sidereal universe what storms may come! Even with the thin covering of atmosphere around our globe temperature, motion, electricity, produce storms of such awful force that they appall us. Yet these are mere nothings compared with the primeval convulsions that took place when our atmosphere was many times deeper and more dense, in that long ago when the earth was very young. Eruptions have been photographed that took place upon the Sun, lifting masses of matter to a height of 280,000 miles above its surface. Yet what are these puny exhibitions of cosmic forces to what might occur if a strayed sun should plunge into the depths of the infinite mass—into that farther beyond, surrounding the stars, where room and storm-producing material are illimitable and unfath-

omable! Inconceivable quantities of gas, stardust, or whatever it may be, would ignite and explode in the wake of that plunging sun. (The "Nova"—temporary stars, are similar phenomena; and they occur within inter-stellar space, where the material needed for their production must be exceedingly scarce, compared with that which surrounds the sidereal universe.) The contrast of temperature between the burning and exploding gases, or clouds, of matter, and the intense cold of the sidereal spaces into which they would be forced, might create cyclonic disturbances powerful enough to toss and play with little planets like Jupiter as our earthly winds toy with grains of dust. The vibrations caused in the neighborhood of these disturbances might impart themselves to other regions of matter, going on and on for countless æons of time; they would never reach the Infinite. They would only enlarge the Finite. However far, and long, these vibrations traveled, they would ever remain as far from the Infinite as when that universe-convulsing explosion took place. There ever lies beyond, an infinite mass of matter which finite disturbances, however vast, can never reach. All the energies exhibited in the finite universe are stored in this infinite mass, but they give no sign; they have no sum-total, for a sum-total is a finite thing. It is only from the Finite

that the energies of attraction, heat, light, electricity, are radiated. Infinity can exert no influence, for every influence is a finite quantity that begins somewhere, and sometime; therefore though it may never end it must always remain finite. It is only through the Finite that anything can be done in the material universe. The Finite is motion, evolution, progress; the Infinite is stagnation awaiting the quickening impulse of the Finite to arouse some portion of it into activity and life.

Infinite space contains no locality where twice two does not make four, where there are ranges of mountains without valleys, where the end will not be later than the beginning, where anything can be accomplished without the lapse of time, where falsehood is truth, and love is hate, where there is no difference between heat and cold, light and darkness, motion and rest, where forms are without outline, where space can be condensed or moved, where nothing is something, where design and chance are the same thing, and produce the same effects. These wild incoherent imaginings have no place even in the Infinite, which only harbors the possible.

If we follow the trend of present thought in astrophysics, we think of star-systems as finite things, and we are thus forced to think of a boundary between finite and infinite space, be-

tween finite and infinite matter. It is not, to be sure, a boundary which *circumscribes* space, for that cannot be conceived; but it gives to infinite space a *finite interior side*. And since it has no other, this finite side of the Infinite is the only one that can ever be reached by any force, power or intelligence, human or divine. Only on this finite side of the Infinite can evolution exist.

Could the Law of Gravitation be manifested in an infinite mass of matter? Newton formulated that law as follows:—

“Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force whose direction is that of a line joining the two, and whose magnitude is directly as the product of their masses, and inversely as the square of their distance from each other.”

In order that what follows may be the better understood, I will restate this law by dividing it into three logical sections without in the least altering its meaning:

(1) *Direction*.—Every particle or body of matter in the universe attracts every other particle or body of matter with a force whose direction is that of a line joining the two.

(2) *Magnitude*.—The magnitude of the force with which particles or bodies of matter attract each other is proportioned to their masses. By the “magnitude” of

force is meant a constant factor, not depending upon anything but the mass. The mass of a body is the quantity of matter it contains; not its volume, for a body of matter in the form of gas may be large in volume, while the same body condensed to a solid will be comparatively small, but the mass will be the same in both cases. That mass, whether in the condition of gas or of a solid, possesses a certain amount of attractive energy; this is called "magnitude," and is unchanging, but:—

(3) *Fluctuation*.—Though the "magnitude" of this attraction of particles or bodies of matter for each other does not change, its force fluctuates so as to increase with decreasing distance and decrease with increasing distance; the ratio of such increase and decrease being such that if two bodies whose centers are eight thousand miles apart attract each other with a force equal to forty horse-power, then, by decreasing the distance to four thousand miles their attraction will be increased to one hundred and sixty horse-power, and by increasing their distance to sixteen thousand miles their attraction will be lessened to ten horse-power; so that as distance is halved the force of attraction is quadrupled, and as distance is doubled that force is quartered. As Young says, a mass that will weigh one hundred pounds at the earth's surface, i.e., four thou-

sand miles from the earth's center, will weigh only twenty-five pounds at an elevation of four thousand miles above the surface—eight thousand miles from the center.¹

What, then, is the force of gravitation able to do in a finite Universe that it could not do in an infinite mass? It seems to be clear that in an infinite space filled with matter, only the first and second sections of the law would be in effect, so that everything would remain at a stand-still. An infinite mass of particles surrounding each individual particle would exert an equal gravitative pull, or stress, in all possible directions, and these forces thus neutralizing each other the condition would be precisely as if they did not exist.

It follows, necessarily, that there is only one condition under which the property of attraction can exhibit itself, and that is, greater proximity of two or more particles or bodies of matter to each other than to any others. This suffices to put into effect the third section of the law. The infinite mass of matter in space cannot be reached by the third section of the law, which does not apply to unity, but to divisions, or parts of the whole. The one infinite mass can therefore be affected only by the first and second sections, whose effect, unaided by the third, is nothing, as we have seen, on ac-

¹ Young's "General Astronomy," pages 115, 116.

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count of neutralization. But when a body, or particle, becomes segregated from the surrounding infinite mass in such way, or to such an extent, that any other particle or body can come nearer to it than to any other, then, when that condition of greater proximity takes place, the third section of the law applies, and those particles or bodies begin to attract each other, governed by all three of the laws of gravitation, but totally unaffected by the attractive energies residing in infinite space.

Thus we are able to conceive the necessity of the boundary above spoken of between the material finite and infinite. The Cause of that elision is beyond the reach of Science, but it was caused in some way, since the star-system must contain a first sun. It is not to be supposed that any such enormous depth of void space marked the first division of the finite from the infinite in the material universe as that which lies between our own solar system and the nearest fixed star. But some zone of separation, greater or less, was indispensable to release the third section of the law of gravitation from its prison of infinity, so that *distance* might become a factor in its manifestation. That law, thus in force, would gradually broaden the distance between the first embryo sun and the infinite mass surrounding it. Finite qualities would be imparted to the mat-

ter composing this new sun and also to the inner crust of that infinite mass. I mean by this, that the third section of the law—that portion of it which operates only under finite conditions—separation, isolation, distance—would now be in effect. This void zone of separation would remove the particles of matter of our embryo sun so far from those composing the inner crust of the surrounding mass that the gravity of the latter, instead of being equal in all directions as it was before, would be weakened upon the side adjoining this empty space, so that the pulls would now be strongest in all directions away from this empty space—inward as to the particles of the new sun, and outward as to the particles at the surface of the surrounding mass. The latter particles, being now appreciably relieved from the stress of gravity upon the inner side, would be pulled more forcibly outward, while the particles of this new sun, being released perceptibly from the stress of gravity on the outside, would begin to attract each other more forcibly, tending, of course, toward the center of gravity within their mass. The surrounding void would be, as it is, intensely cold. The condensation taking place in the new sun, and in the inner crust of the mass beyond this region of cold, would produce heat; as the condensation became greater the heat would become more

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intense. This condensation and consequent production of heat would go on with far greater rapidity in the new sun, because there everything would converge toward the center. Eruptions, caused by explosions in the more condensed matter from which the new sun was forming, would shoot across this empty space and enter the infinite mass, causing storms, explosions, and convulsions in it. These explosions, following the line of least resistance, would shoot inward, populating this zone of separation with other bodies of matter which, governed by the third section of the law, would condense. They might fall into the new sun if propelled in one direction; propelled in other directions, they would either revolve around it or re-enter the infinite mass at some other point, igniting it and causing new explosions with similar effects. This process once begun must go on forever. Any cessation of it is inconceivable, because any cessation of its cause is impossible. The Finite has obtained a foothold in space; evolution has begun. The gradual enlargement of that finite universe is now inevitable; it constantly bombards the Infinite, sending its conquering invasions across the abyss of separation, adding new regions to the Finite. It will never stop for lack of other worlds to conquer, for all about it lies the impotent mass of the Infinite, powerless to move

and strong only in its exhaustless supply which suffers nothing by depletion, remaining after each new raid from the Finite as plethoric as before.

Such a theory as above suggested for the beginning of Cosmogony is unnecessary to the present discussion, but the forces and laws illustrated by it must have been involved, in some way, at the beginning of material creation, and, however manifested, they could account for everything that is seen in the physical universe except the one transcendent fact of *order*, which thus far has found no satisfactory scientific explanation. A supervising Cause capable of giving *direction* to nature's blind forces is the satisfying philosophical solvent of this fact suggested by Oliver Lodge.² Thus we pass to another Infinite quite different from the Material one above considered—an Infinite which, though limited by Space in its Material achievements, derives its individuality from qualities non-spatial and non-material.

² "Life and Matter," Chapter IX.

CHAPTER III

THE NON-SPATIAL FINITE AND INFINITE

Nature, defined as including all finites, material and ideal, is to be distinguished from its two Causes which are infinite but unlike, and in philosophy are named the "efficient cause" and the "material cause"—terms that will be explained in a later chapter.

A thought is a finite Thing, but the mind which gives birth to it need not necessarily be conceived as finite. Though a thought may invade Space or Time, the former does not enter into it as an essential ingredient, as both do into material forms, whose very existence is in part derived from these two infinite Realities. If we try to conceive an infinite supervising Mind as thinking, we are limited to a conception of finite thoughts, as emanating therefrom. We meet no difficulty in such a conception, because if we believe in God we are compelled to admit that many finite things must be the outcome of His finite thoughts. And this brings us to a question which we must in some way answer:—If the Infinite Mind can think finitely, what is the distinction between it and

a finite mind? The tenets of Idealism suggest this question with great emphasis.

The resurrection of Idealism in Christian lands, from the philosophizings of Plato and other Greek thinkers, and its rehabilitation in some of the garments of Christianity, was the thought and work of leaders and thinkers, able, learned, good; the best, in impulse, in ideal, and in effort. It was the command, "halt!" uttered by dissenters from Materialism, to a multitude blindly attracted thereto. It was a command from men great enough to make themselves heard and respected, and it directed our attention to an idea the reverse of Materialism but founded upon an identical logic. It said to those who had been looking toward Materialism in the search for Monism, "You pursue a phantom. Matter does not exist except as our minds conceive it. Matter is naught, Mind is all." It supported this statement with arguments that made thinkers pause, caused some to scoff, others to ponder and mistrust the means which God gave them of learning truth; and it confused many into a dream-like sort of conviction—a belief that they believed what is unbelievable. It confronted the leaders of Materialism with an opposing army which they must conquer, else retreat. It was as easy to say, "There is only one eternal essence," God, or Mind, or Spirit, as it was to

say the same thing of matter. Mind was just as much a fact as Matter to the most clumsy thinker. Indeed, it was the more obvious fact of the two, since without it matter could not be cognized or known. And so, in the deeper currents of thought, Idealism could not fail to be accorded the best of the argument.

Idealism has not routed Materialism; but it will hold the enemy at bay until Science takes possession of the battlefield. The day is coming when Intellect will be the efficient ally of Faith; but we must look to Science to bring about that much-to-be-desired result. None but its patient investigators can enable us to see that both Idealism and Materialism are out of joint with the world of *facts*. We must rely upon these independent thinkers, unprejudiced souls, whose banner bears not the motto of any cult or creed, but the one shining word, "Truth." As to religion, or theological ideas, they are not striving to approve or condemn. Nor do they always realize how scientific discoveries affect religion. Nevertheless their work cannot result otherwise, since Religion, if it be anything, must be Truth. Indeed Science is already working a marvelous change in Religion.

If our minds possessed even the same dormant intuition of God's spatial infinity that is often awakened in men as to the fact of His

existence and presence, the idealistic conception would not be so difficult to grasp. We have no trouble in thinking of Space as infinite. It is impossible to conceive it as finite. But to think of God we must assign Him qualities which are, to us, hardly conceivable as attributes of that which is spatially infinite. In normal minds, under normal conditions, consciousness and intuition are not at odds with experience, or the orderly course of nature, and so, when we have learned that certain rules apply to certain conditions in one realm of nature we expect to find the same rules in force wherever the same conditions exist. In other words, we are conscious through intuition that what is truth here and to-day is truth everywhere and always. Therefore, having learned that throughout terrestrial nature the power to act and move, and the ability to impart knowledge or motion to persons and things, are attributes of the spatially finite, this experience hinders us from accepting belief that the spatially infinite can have any of these virtues, or can impart to others what it does not itself possess. The qualities of inactivity and immobility belong to infinite space, and so they necessarily belong to everything that is spatially infinite. *Within* space, finite forms and personalities are possible, and may move, exert force, and accomplish results; but not through-

out space. If God filled all space, would He not be inert, immovable, devoid of power, understanding, will, or any quality found in the spatially finite? Could He be the "Supreme Being"? An impersonal being is a mere contradiction of terms which annuls itself, and is therefore intuitively rejected by the human consciousness. Personality and Infinity, considered spatially, cannot exist together, for the one is compelled to have form and outline while the other cannot possibly possess either.

It will be apparent that if Matter is not coextensive with Space, material nature must have limits; therefore a Nature-God, so called, would not be spatially infinite. Again, if we shall be compelled to believe that matter is spatially infinite, but that the region of space is finite wherein it exhibits those varied forms, motions and phenomena, known in their totality as the material universe, then the God of Idealistic Pantheism is of necessity a finite Being, for He exists only in and throughout nature, and nature, if now finite, can never become infinite.

But, again, if we conceive of primary matter as filling infinite space, the combinations under which it can assume forms as atoms and compounds—its properties and potentialities of adaptation and use—comprise only a finite number, all of which God understands. And,

understanding what can be done with matter in a finite part of space, He knows what can be done with it everywhere; and what He has power to do with it in a finite universe He can do with it everywhere; therefore His understanding and His power are infinite.

Motion is a finite idea; it cannot be conceived otherwise; we cannot think of it by itself, alone; it does not exist as an entity. When we think of motion we are forced to think also of something else—the thing that is moved—and this is of necessity a finite thing, so that it may have room outside of itself to move in, which it could not have if spatially infinite. So obvious is this, that we intuitively recognize as finite all moving things; and if we could, in a flight through space, reach a place where there was absolute rest, we should know that we had passed the boundary of the finite and reached the infinite.

If we concede a theory held by some philosophers—that matter exists infinitely as finite forms—suns, planets, meteors, nebulae, dust, etc., and that all these are in motion, it would still remain true that this infinity of material forms could not move *as a whole*. Each of them could have its own motion, but there could be no possible impulse that would carry all of them with it, since there is no space outside of infinite space in which such motion could

take place. Therefore, since the spatially infinite cannot move, God, instead of being limited in any sense by a conception that He is spatially finite, is thus ideally removed from a condition of absolute inertia to one where motion is possible. But, although spatial infinity is the absolute zero of motion, the reverse is true as to mental and spiritual powers and all things which cannot be described or explained in terms of space.

I have argued that what may be called God's "infinite understanding" as to Matter and its prerogatives, motion and force, means simply that he understands them all,—what can and what cannot be accomplished with these material things, constituting, as they do, only a finite number. It is the quality of *inexhaustibleness* that warrants us in classing such a Mind among the infinities. No demand upon it can overcome its power or reduce its efficiency. In this respect it parallels infinite matter, which must remain undiminished by all encroachments of the finite. In the realm of ideas, infinity would have this meaning as an attribute of the Supreme Mind. Ideas constitute, of necessity, a finite number. The output of that Mind is, therefore, finite, because the range in which it is active is finite. Its infinity is only potential, never manifested. It can meet all questions propounded by infinite

Time, as they arise. It may even foresee them as much as its purposes require, since they and their causes and laws must constitute a finite number. This conception of infinite understanding and power does not assume the production of results without the lapse of time. A result is a finite thing always—a phenomenon the process of which begins, matures and ends. There enters into its production more or less time, depending upon its difficulty. This is unavoidable, since Time is one of the eternal Realities, co-existent with Cause. Neither does this conception admit any result which is unreal, or a contradiction of absolute reality—such as false-truth, good-evil, designed-chance, loving-hate, a straight circumference, etc. The Possible alone can exist. Its ideal opposite, the Impossible, must therefore be always non-existent.

CHAPTER IV

"LAW "

The term "law" has been employed, and it is to be used further, in the present discussion. To guard against confusion and misapprehension, let us define the sense in which this term is to be understood. In "Problems of Philosophy," Doctor Hyslop says:

"We are not satisfied with the mere occurrence of events or phenomena, but we seek to know the law of that occurrence. The term 'law' is variously interpreted. Sometimes it refers to the 'conditions' of an event's occurrence. Now 'conditions' is a term that is equivocal. It may denote either an active cause of events or the passive invariable concomitant of them. In my own conception, however, law does not properly express 'conditions' of any kind, but only regularity. The idea of causality, whether static or dynamic, has no right to association with it. It is a name for the constancy of events, or regular order, the uniformity of co-existence and sequence."

I think Hyslop's position is impregnable. "Law" is not a cause. There is, however, a law of causation. It is embodied in John

Fiske's statement that “in all cases an aggregate of like causes will be followed by an aggregate of like effects.” The fact that this is always true makes it a “law.” This is indeed the *lex legis* of the cosmos; the law of laws; the great, universal law of events, manifested in and through all phenomena.

The term “law” cannot properly be used in the sense of being a cause. It only signifies the regularity with which causes produce their effects. Yet there exists in the common mind a vague belief that it is a name given occult forces of nature which operate as causes of phenomena. For example, we are apt to think that by the law of gravitation is meant that mysterious force which draws, or impels, two bodies of matter toward each other. The truth, however, is that when we speak of the “law of gravitation” we refer to the fact that bodies, or particles of matter, always attract each other under conditions of mass and distance; that all variations in mass and distance are always followed by variations in their attraction for each other; and that the consequence of any given variation of mass or distance in one case, will always be the same in every identical case.

The confusion on this subject, in the popular mind, is no doubt due to the fact that in the literature of both science and philosophy it has

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been found convenient to use a figure of speech known as metonymy, one variety of which uses the name of an effect as a name for the cause. Thus we say, "Nature produces all changes in the physical universe." We might reverse this and say, "The physical universe produces all changes in nature." We say, "Science analyzes and classifies phenomena," the fact being that the analysis and classification of phenomena is science. Or we say, "The law of natural selection preserves those individuals who fit their environment best"; but we mean that concord with environment is a cause which necessarily tends to preserve the individual. Material bodies gravitate toward each other, not because of any compelling "law," but because they have within them this gravitative force, or tendency. It is because this fact of gravitation of matter toward matter is universal, and always exhibited in the same degree when conditions of mass and distance are taken into account, that we say, "the law of gravitation." So with other "laws" of nature. Knowing that there must be a cause for every phenomenon: that "something cannot come from nothing," that when causes are in all respects identical results will be identical, and finding it convenient to have a word which will, with some degree of approximation, express the idea that this relation between cause and effect is con-

stant, we have pressed into this service the word "law." It is, in brief, a name for facts which may have other names. It is not a name for itself. It has no self-hood. We see then, that the skeptic who attempts to eliminate God from the universe by substituting for Him "law," is guilty of an absurdity, inasmuch as the thing which he substitutes for the idea of God is nothing more than a word used to signify the fact that causes produce their effects with regularity.

When Hyslop says, "We are not satisfied with the mere occurrence of events, or phenomena, but we seek to know the law of that occurrence," he states the case rather conservatively. We are not "satisfied" fully even when we discover the "law," unless, in observing the conditions of its manifestation, we are made aware of the causes that operate in the case. Hence, although Newton formulated the "law of gravitation" in 1685, science and philosophy are still asking, What is its cause? As F. R. Moulton says, in his "Introduction to Astronomy," "Newton confessed his ignorance as to the cause of this attraction, and it is not yet known." Indeed, it is fairly probable that Newton's formula of gravitation does not embrace it entirely. Certain observed facts appear to indicate that if the attracting bodies of matter are possessed of motions not at-

tributable to their attraction for each other, this extra motion affects the attractive force in some unknown ratio. Again, it seems we may have to qualify the statement, "Every particle of matter attracts every other particle with a force which is proportioned to the product of their masses and which varies inversely as the square of their distance apart." This is not true of particles as small as atoms or molecules; they sometimes attract and sometimes repel each other. Neither the causes of such contrary behavior nor the laws manifested thereby are yet known. Nor do we know the cause, or the law, involved in the attraction of cohesion, though we do know that, whatever they may be, they are not within Newton's law of gravitation.

These remarks are not unrelated to the present inquiry. They bring us to a realization of our weakness and ignorance: of a condition of growth in the human race not so very far removed from infancy. A few laws we have discovered, and the causes that underlie them. Some we have detected in part but not fully. Others we have found without obtaining an inkling of the causes which account for them.

Our planet teems with phenomena the "laws" and causes of whose occurrence are wholly unknown, not even conjectured: the phenomena of life, consciousness, self-volition, self-activ-

ity, the molecular and sub-molecular attractions, repulsions and affinities of matter in its smaller forms, the gravitation of larger bodies toward each other. And if we think of these few generalizations, concerning the causes and laws of which little or nothing is known, we shall see that they include almost all phenomena that have been brought to our cognizance through sense or intellect. Is not this enough to warn us that, when we are wholly ignorant as to causes, it is unwise to scout, or dogmatically deny, the probability of Divine interposition as an efficient cause, in the initiation of a series of phenomena, or in the production of some unprecedented phenomenon which may not give birth to a series? Truly, those who refuse this ground to miracle are inconsistent unless they further deny God, for they make Him as useless in the cosmos as a brazen image.

Yet there are Christians who improvidently content themselves with the idea that all phenomena, past, present and future, may be attributed to “law,” and who thereby mean forces and causes in which Deity has no direct hand. That God Himself should in any case enter directly into the production of a phenomenon, as one of the factors that go to make up the sum of causes whereby the law of its occurrence is made manifest, does not appear to them essential to an idea of Him as all-powerful and

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all-wise. Let such thinkers think again, and to better purpose. The term "phenomena" embraces every event that has ever occurred or ever can. If we think God is never an efficient cause of phenomena, of what shall we think Him the cause? There is nothing left. In excluding Him totally as a cause of phenomena we exclude and deny Him utterly.

CHAPTER V

"CAUSE"

I have endeavored to prove that "law" is not a name for cause of any sort; that it is a name only for the fact of regularity of relation between cause and effect; consequently that it means nothing which can be substituted for the idea of God, provided we can find anything in the cosmos for which the cosmos reveals no cause. But what do we mean by this word "cause"?

Causes have been classed under four heads, viz., material causes, efficient causes, final causes and logical causes. The term "final cause" means not really a cause but rather an effect: that is to say, the end or purpose to which other causes tend. The term "logical cause" refers to causes by which the mind is convinced. I shall leave these two out of the present discussion. Indeed I seriously doubt that any benefit can come to clear thinking from their inclusion in a classification of causes. However that may be, the consideration of material and efficient causes will suffice for our purposes here.

What is meant by these terms? They stand

for two ideas that seem much unlike. The "efficient" cause of a phenomenon is that which gives it form—brings it within the categories of identity and difference—gives it self-hood. The "material" cause of this same phenomenon is that upon which the "efficient" cause operates in order to produce that form. The material cause does nothing. It is not an operative cause. It is passive, dormant, inert, so far as the phenomenon under inspection is concerned, until it is touched, awakened and put in motion by the "efficient" cause.

To illustrate: Our bodies are all composed of matter. Matter is therefore one of the "material" causes of our bodies. Yet the condition that accords best with matter is quiescence. Then, as our bodies in order to exist must have space to exist in, and also time, if only the briefest moment, therefore time and space are also "material" causes of our bodies. Yet no one can conceive of space or time being a "cause" in any true sense of the word, nor as being material, in the sense of "matter."

The paucity of language, and the compulsory demand of ideas for word symbols, have forced us to use this word "cause" for expressing these two unlike things, and to represent their unlikeness by the qualifying words "efficient" and "material." The difference indicated in legal phraseology by the termination

“or” and “ee”—“donor” “donee,” etc.—seems to express what is meant in philosophy by the adjectives “efficient” and “material,” as applied to “cause.” But, as no license exists for the use of such words as “causor” and “causee,” we shall have to get along without them for the time being, and profit by Hyslop’s consoling advice,—any word will do if only defined. Nor is it a vital matter whether the definition be such as you or I or the dictionary would approve. The important thing is a definition of the sense in which a speaker or writer uses a term. If we know that much, we shall understand him. Hence if my use of the terms “material cause” and “efficient cause” does not accord with the idea of some reader, I trust this will not prevent him, or her, from getting at my meaning.

My own idea (and I think it follows Hyslop’s exposition) is that the real cause of the existence of any finite thing, i.e., any form, is termed the “efficient” cause; and that some other thing upon which the efficient cause operates to produce a form is called the “material” cause. We must also remember that this word “material” does not necessarily imply “matter.” It implies matter if the form produced is composed of matter; life, if it be a form of life; mind, if it be a form of mind. In a rock it implies matter; in a plant, matter

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plus life; in an animal, matter plus life, plus mind.

In the organic kingdom the only form of which we can have sensual knowledge is the material, because our senses, at least such as we have thus far discovered, are affected only by material forms and forces. But, through the phenomena of germination, growth, and reproduction, our judgments cognize the unseen and intangible life-forms in the vegetable and animal kingdoms; and, from the added phenomenon of self-activity—the power to initiate motion in themselves—and from other distinguishing marks, we cognize in animals the mental forms. Cognizing these mental forms, we know that they must each and all have had the two sorts of cause which have been here named as “material” and “efficient.” That is to say: before *first* forms of these could possibly exist as forms, there must have been that substance or essence from which they derive their nature, and that cause which has acted upon this substance, or essence, to give it the particular form which we discern in it. It is, of course, inconceivable that a phenomenon could happen without any cause whatever. And it would be a similar absurdity, differing in degree only, not in kind, to think that a phenomenon might transcend its cause, for this would mean that, in part, it was uncaused. Now the causes of phenomena, so far

as they are known, from observation and experience, are invariably other phenomena which precede, or accompany, and combine to produce them; but there are phenomena the causes of which are unknown to us: such as the micro-organism called a “moner” in the animal kingdom, the power of an animal to move itself in a *willed* direction and countless others.

And then, a few moments’ reflection will lead us to the conclusion that, in the material world at least, we must conceive of first phenomena, or stop thinking. Our minds revert in thought to a first form of vegetable life, a first form of animal life, a first form of conscious mind. We are driven to this conception because these forms exist all about us, because we know that in nature they are never produced except from pre-existing forms of life and mind, and because we know, from geology, that the time was when no form of life whatever could have existed for a moment upon our planet. We approach the point where we are obliged to think of God as an efficient and direct cause, when we come to first forms. Science has not given any other explanation; nor do scientists, as a rule, hope for a scientific solution of them. If ever unraveled it must be by religion; or philosophy, which more and more tends to become religion. But I postpone discussing this matter to a future chapter.

CHAPTER VI

MIRACLES

At the temporal boundary of the finite we reach the miraculous; and by this word "boundary" I do not mean some one distant moment of the Past, but any moment, past, present or future, when an event or phenomenon is initiated, not entirely caused by other phenomena accompanying or antecedent thereto. Such an event, or phenomenon, if it could happen, would be either wholly or partially brought about by the direct intervention of the One great supervising efficient Cause to which we English-speaking people give the name, God.

The word "Miracle" comes to us, with a French twist, from the Latin *mirari*—to wonder. The world teems with inexplicable facts: the gravitation of matter toward matter, molecular attraction and repulsion, life, self-consciousness, self-volition, self-activity, and thousands of other wonders. Every moment of our lives, inexpressibly marvelous facts are occurring in and about us. Yet, though this word "miracle" is occasionally used in its broad, philological sense, to characterize in-

scrutable or exceptional events, the controversy of which it reminds us relates to a quite restricted meaning which is to be considered here. In this narrow sense, a "Miracle" is defined by the "Standard Dictionary" as: "An event in the natural world but out of its established order, and possible only by the intervention and exertion of divine power." Necessarily, any definition must omit, as this one does, the observer's mental attitude. A may declare that he has observed an event which is out of the established order of nature, but B may pertinently inquire whether A has solved the whole "riddle of the universe" and obtained a knowledge of the "established order" in its entirety, or whether he is not really assuming that a fraction of it, known to him, is the whole?

The attitude of a scientist toward A's belief that he had witnessed a miracle would depend on circumstances: he might know that the event was in accord with nature's laws, in which case he would attribute A's belief to ignorance; he might know that the alleged event was opposed to some law of nature, in which case he would set it down as impossible and say that A was deceived; or he might know that the event had actually occurred, that it was not a subversion of any known law, yet could not be explained, in which case he would insist

upon a law, for its occurrence, that had not been discovered.

Analysis of this attitude of the scientific mind resolves it easily into the simple proposition that every phenomenon occurs according to some law, known or unknown: that "miracles," in the sense of events that transcend law do not occur and are impossible. This attitude is set forth as follows by J. S. Mill in his "System of Logic":

"For every event there exists some combination of objects or events, some given concurrence of circumstances, positive and negative, the occurrence of which is always followed by that phenomenon. We may not have found out what this concurrence of circumstances may be; but we never doubt that there is such a one, and that it never occurs without having the phenomenon in question as its effect or consequence."

I must confess myself unable to agree with this extreme scientific view—that divine interposition, guidance or supervision, can never be manifested save through law. But, whether "miracles," in the sense of events wholly or partially unrelated to law, happen occasionally or not at all, we should know better than to estimate the miraculous quality of an event from the fact that it is inexplicable, because we ought to realize our own mental limitations,

and that there may be plenty of mysteries perfectly explainable if our intellects were more fully developed than they are, or our knowledge of laws more extensive. We should also consider that there may be many laws in the universe that have not yet been detected. Indeed, the fact that we are occasionally making new discoveries of such laws is enough to give us confidence that there are others still hidden from us. This is why a scientist, observing a fact which he cannot explain, refers it to undiscovered law. Less trained minds may class it as miraculous.

Nor would a scientist call an inexplicable event miraculous because it is one that happens seldom, or even one the like of which never before happened so far as geology, the history of nature or human history discloses. Having observed in the cautious, painstaking way of science, and finding himself obliged to call it a fact, he must attribute it to some unknown law. This is the way the scientist deals now with all inexplicable things, whether their occurrence be frequent or rare, for he knows that even among the laws that have been discovered there are several which do not manifest themselves constantly, because the conditions which afford occasion for their manifestation are not constant. There may be unknown laws which manifest themselves in the presence of

conditions that do not occur once in a trillion years. The potentialities of the universe are to be measured only by Eternity. What varied assemblages of conditions, calling into manifestation laws beyond the scope of human experience, may have taken place in the infinite past, or may come to pass in the infinite future, we can never know. We know that above and below the little rift of light in Time's prism which experience has made visible, there exists the possible but not the impossible. Science has disclosed a few truths, but the range of inquiry is illimitable.

If, then, an event which is wholly or partially inexplicable, or unlike any other within human experience, is not to be called miraculous, what is a "Miracle"? Whether an event will be *called* miraculous or not, in the sense of including in its cause a special interposition by a Divine Ruler, unrelated to any of His "laws," will depend sometimes upon the nature of the event, and sometimes upon the mental attitude of the observer. Observers of strange and inexplicable phenomena may be divided into three general classes:

I. Those who have learned little or nothing of the theory that God acts only according to laws, and who have been trained to conceive Him as constantly interposing in human affairs.

II. Those who believe that divine supervision is never manifested save through laws.

III. Those who believe that God supervises all events, that He does this almost always through laws, but nevertheless may, and does upon rare occasions, act independently of law.

By such reflections as these we are led to consider the mental attitude in which one should apply himself to the question of miracles. To search for the real, here, requires no impossible frame of mind. The best equipment for it is an overmastering love of truth, fearlessness, an unbiased mind, critical observation and good judgment. If our love for truth is sufficiently strong we shall not willingly deceive ourselves. If we are fearless we shall not have such dread of facts as many Christian teachers exhibited when faced by Darwin's and Wallace's discoveries, nor such fear as deters a majority of scientists from investigating psychic phenomena.

We are in danger of thinking that we know all "laws." We know some of them; we occasionally discover others, before unknown. How many remain undiscovered? Who can answer? Consider the phenomenon, light: we have our little prismatic boundary within which we can see, but above the red and below the violet we must grope; we are finding facts outside of this boundary of vision: new forms

of radiant energy. How much exists there yet undetected, possibly unfathomable? How are we ever going to know that the regions of the ultra-violet and ultra-red have been completely explored? We cannot conceive a criterion for judgment upon such a question. So with the domain of "law"; we can never know how much it contains besides what we shall have found there. Judging from many utterances of both Scientists and Christians, they stand in equal need of taking this lesson of humility to heart.

I adopt the scientific *argument* upon the question of miracles fully and unreservedly and have stated it as strongly as it is in my power to do. I have done this in order to show that my dissent from the scientific *conclusion* that miracles are impossible, is due to no failure in apprehending the full force of that argument. I only take issue with the *assumption* that it covers the entire range of possible phenomena.

Since Herbert Spencer, by proving the universality of Evolution, placed Religion upon a more secure foundation than it had ever occupied before, it has become difficult for a thinking person to believe that "miracles" would occur except as an aid, or reinforcement, to this universal scheme, Evolution, if the universe is supervised by an Omnipotent Intelligence, as it appears to be. Nevertheless, there is no difficulty in conceiving that this

Intelligence, which we name God, might at times find it convenient or necessary to interpose (just as He must have done when first forms of life and mind appeared on Earth) for the purpose of bringing to pass some new order of things to the production of which pre-existing causes and conditions are inadequate. He who ponders deeply the *fact* of Evolution, must be led to believe that its highest and ultimate purpose is the growth of enduring mental personalities. He who studies its methods must see that mental growth is not attained, and cannot be, without the effort of a mind to acquire increased efficiency and to overcome such difficulty as interposes to hinder that effort. Judging from this universal object lesson, taught by every one's observation and experience, we must realize that any divine revelation to mankind of truth which God has given us the means of discovering through our own efforts, would be a hindrance to our mental evolution and hence would be outside of the legitimate sphere of the miraculous above suggested. The same can be said of divine interposition to relieve hunger and distress, assuming that it is also a function of Evolution to improve mankind altruistically—to make us more and more inclined to obey the great commandment, "Love thy neighbor as thyself." The Earth and the fullness thereof

are ample for the supply of human bodily needs; enough people are strong physically and mentally to keep those from want who are unable adequately to help themselves. "Poverty" and "want" are not absolute, but relative, terms; therefore the ideas which they embody will change as ideals of comfort change, but they can hardly cease to represent realities of some kind, if altruism is worth while, because, by the law of mental growth, proficiency is only attained through practice. The more we come to realize that we are our brother's keepers, the nearer shall we attain to the stature our Father has planned that we shall grow into through Evolution; therefore, He will neither assist the human family to results which He has given us means of attaining, nor help those needy ones whom we are able to relieve, because such intervention by Him would, to the extent of His interference, retard the two apparently highest purposes of His divine process of Evolution.

The suggestion that God interposes directly only to assist His evolutionary process, eliminates practically the entire ideal area of the miraculous, as hitherto conceived, and puts in its place a territory which man has no power to explore or measure. Assuming that such phenomena happen, supernaturally, in the natural world, they either occur so seldom,

or the efficient Cause of them is so hidden from us that we can hardly believe "Miracle" to be a means through which God designs to apprise us of His presence and supervision in the Universe. Nothing is *known* to me which I would class as supernatural, except the first form, or forms, of conscious life, which Haeckel admits must have been either miracle or the result of spontaneous generation. And I am compelled to regard spontaneous generation as more wonderful, inexplicable and out of joint with the Universe than a miracle could be. More, as to this, in a future chapter.

But, thus limited as to what I would dare call *knowledge* of the miraculous, it is, nevertheless, easy for me to conceive that miracles may have often occurred in aid of evolution in the realms of life and mind, and they may take place, even frequently, in the world of ideas.

The skeptic and the religionist have taken extreme positions. We have no reason to believe that the Ruler of the universe is the personal and immediate cause of all phenomena. We have many reasons to think that such is not His method. On the other hand, if we believe in Him, it is illogical to assume that He never acts in this way, but always indirectly, through forces and conditions and substances which He brought into existence once upon a time, and left to produce and differenti-

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ate forms, under the law of evolution, paying no further heed to them, and having no work to do thereafter.

John Fiske coined a large word—"deanthropomorphization." It means the process of eliminating divine action as a cause of phenomena. It has been going on for untold ages. It began, doubtless, in some such simple observation as that rain does not fall out of a perfectly clear sky. Man, having made this observation, would reason that when God wanted it to rain He made a cloud, and the cloud caused the rain. Before making the observation he might think that the rain was the direct act of God. The process thus begun has gone forward, finding the cloud phenomena to be caused by other physical phenomena, these again by others, and so on. Thus we have found that rain, clouds, air-currents, temperature, humidity, are not miracles, but the results of other existing phenomena, and we must search farther back if we would find a direct act of God from which all these consequences have resulted.

The laboratory of nature, terrestrial and celestial, lies before us. Intellectual power to observe, investigate and comprehend its marvels, has been bestowed upon us, together with an overmastering curiosity to learn about them. With such an equipment of opportunity, ca-

capacity and desire, we have no need that this class of truths should be miraculously revealed. Indeed it is clear that such revelations could only dwarf our intellects by depriving them of that use through which alone growth can come.

Therefore it is not in affairs which appertain to such interests and concerns as the creature has been equipped for, that we should expect the causation of phenomena through divine intervention. If we assume that God can cause phenomena which in the course of nature would not have occurred otherwise, we cannot be assured that our knowledge of our environment, material and spiritual, is so perfect that we can give an infallible judgment concerning the sufficiency of our present mental and physical equipment to deal with all possible phases of that environment. In other words, we cannot know, absolutely, that God in His infinite wisdom may not see good reason for direct interposition in the interests of further human progress. We know not but that some astounding miracle may take place at any moment. This must, logically, be the mental attitude of all who believe that God can act in this direct way.

Daniel Webster used to say that we ought to constantly keep in mind the fundamental truths of government, and observe whether or not we are, in our political measures, conforming there-

to. It is like keeping one's watch regulated by comparing it with some authentic timepiece. The present discussion relates to miracles, and it may be well now to recall the definition of the word, and be sure that we understand its meaning: "An event in the natural world, but out of its established order and possible only by the intervention and exertion of divine power."

This definition is not clear unless we know what is meant by "the natural world," and "its established order." If by "the natural world" is meant the physical universe and its material forms of life, there is another, and a more interesting realm—the world of consciousness. And most of us believe there exists a still more important one—the world of spirit. No good reason can be advanced for characterizing direct divine action in any one of these worlds as more or less miraculous than it would be in the others. The question is whether the efficient cause of a given phenomenon can be found in the forces, conditions and substances of nature (defined as in Chapter ii) or whether these, of themselves alone, could cause it without a special act of divine power and intelligence. The question is not *where* the phenomenon occurred—whether in mind, matter or spirit. Whatever the phenomenon may be, if God was the efficient cause of it, or if He entered into the causation directly, as an indispensable part

thereof, it must be regarded as miraculous.

It is not so easy to dispose of the other clause of the definition: "out of the established order." As before stated, the use of these words is unjustifiable, unless we qualify them. We do not know what the established order of the universe, in its entirety, is. We do know some facts concerning it. Some of its laws we have reason to believe we know completely, or practically so. Others we know in part, but realize that we do not know them fully. Certain phenomena assure us that other laws must exist, but beyond this assurance we know nothing of them. As to the forces of nature the same statement should be made: some we know, others we know in part, others not at all. So it is with our knowledge of the substance of matter and the phenomena of differentiation thereof into the various chemical elements. As to all these things the human race has had no more than two or three centuries of education, so that our knowledge cannot be other than vague and limited, except as to a few things.

Hence if we are to put this expression into our definition of the word "miracle," we should qualify it by adding "so far as is known to us" or some equivalent phrase. But, though this would add a decent element of humility to the definition, ambiguity would remain.

In view of these considerations, I would suggest the following as a true definition: *A miracle is a phenomenon, of which an act of God is a direct, efficient cause, and which no other cause could, alone, have brought about.*

I have spoken of the innate improbability of the idea that God interferes with the evolution of His creatures, by doing for them that which they can themselves do. But what are we to think when we revert to that time when the creature had not come into existence—that time when the creature could not exist, no earthly habitat suitable for its existence having been prepared? The creature, being non-existent as yet, could do nothing toward preparing its own habitat. What of the first beginning of the creature as we now find him? Could the creature create his own first form? We are taught by both science and philosophy to believe that something cannot come from nothing: that no phenomenon is self-caused. Yet there surely was a long epoch in our planet's past history during which no form of life existed or could exist upon it. Some certain moment of the past ended that epoch, and the next moment there was one or more forms of life upon our earth.

If we could believe that the Earth has existed for all eternity, and has been forever inhabitable by forms of animal life, we might,

provisionally, adopt the theory that life in some form has always existed here. But the investigations of geologists and physicists prevent such a belief. The Earth has not always existed. Yet it teems with animal forms now. They had a beginning, and so they must have been supernaturally caused. As, in the order of nature, every phenomenon has a "material" cause: to wit, the substance, or essence, which enters into it, and an efficient cause that gives it self-hood, I must believe that it was so in the case of these first forms: that the material cause of them, namely, the substances of which they are composed, could not also be the efficient cause of their taking upon themselves enduring animal forms transmittable to their posterity. I may not be able to comprehend the idea of God's eternal existence. But neither can I comprehend the eternal existence of matter, though, unless I deny its existence, I am forced to believe it eternal. John Fiske says, "It can never have been possible to frame in thought an equation between something and nothing. Yet this is the impossibility which must be surmounted before the annihilation or creation of a particle of matter can become representable in consciousness."¹ To my mind this proposition is as self-evident as that twice two are four. As we know that matter exists and

¹ "Cosmic Philosophy," vol. i, page 65.

that something cannot come from nothing, we know that, in some state, it must have had eternal existence. So, as we know that first forms of life and mind have not always existed, we know that they must have been formed by some efficient cause apart from their own substance. Thus we come to the necessity of postulating God as the direct efficient cause of one phenomenon. And if He caused one phenomenon in this miraculous way, the fact is proved that this is one of His methods. The conclusion must follow that He acts in this direct way whenever His wisdom dictates.

In the case of the first form of animal life, the most important and most wonderful part of the miraculous result was the endowment of inanimate matter with life and mentality, and the power to transmit these traits to posterity. By this miracle we are assured of God's power to perform another miracle thereafter whenever His general scheme of evolution could be aided thereby. And so we are not forced to trace all present forms of animal life back to the moner, but are ready to agree with George Darwin who, following in the path blazed by his renowned father, has felt compelled to admit that forms of animal life have appeared upon the earth which are not accounted for by or through pre-existing forms.

The purpose of the argument set forth in

this and preceding chapters, has been to establish the following propositions:

1. That we cannot reasonably attribute the first forms of conscious life upon our planet to any efficient cause other than direct divine interposition.

2. That being forced to adopt the miraculous explanation for the first forms of conscious life, we must believe that this is one of God's methods, and that He uses it whenever His wisdom dictates.

3. That our knowledge of forces, conditions, substance and "law" is too limited to warrant us in assuming that we are able to observe and know whenever a miracle is performed in God's dealings with the universe, and with the lives, minds and destinies of His creatures. Psychological and biological miracles might often happen without our knowledge. I realize, to the full, how far-reaching this conclusion is, yet it must be inevitable if we admit that God performed a biological miracle when He brought into existence first forms of life and mind, or a psychological miracle when Paul was converted.

4. That God in working a miracle is never to be regarded as entering into or forming any part of what in a former chapter has been explained as being the material cause of a phenomenon; that His miraculous interposition can

only appear as the efficient cause or one of the efficient causes.

5. That we know not the day or the hour when God will work a miracle in His universe; nor can we conjecture what sort of miracle will happen, except that we know its effect will be beneficent, for He is our loving Father.

6. We have no reason to expect that miracles will be performed for the production of events, other than those which may be classed, distinctively, as Divine affairs; that is, affairs that do not, at the moment, pertain to any then existing interests of God's creatures: e.g., the preparation of this planet for animal life, the introduction of forms of life, and such necessary changes thereafter as would not otherwise have occurred. By such miracles new conditions may be introduced to which new laws apply. Thereafter these new conditions will be potential in the development of the creature in new fields of growth before unattainable. New conditions of environment or of conscious life cause the creature's evolution into a higher type whose happiness requires increasing knowledge of concerns that were inapplicable to former conditions.

7. When we deal with evolution we find only the finite, i.e., forms. We meet only questions that we may reasonably hope to solve by present scientific methods. But this is because in the

history of evolution we find only forms that have come from antecedent forms; and when our investigations bring us to a first form, ideal or material, not thus caused, we have reached the Infinite. We have come upon a thing linked directly with one or more of the self-existent infinities—Matter, Time, Space, Life, Mind, Spirit. Some or all of these must enter into it as material causes and this cannot be done without the intervention of Divinity as the efficient Cause. We are forced to this conclusion from our inability to conceive that something can come from nothing. Thus we are driven *nolens volens* to the conclusion that, without a miracle, evolution, which deals only with forms, would never have had a form to begin upon; that the miracle is one of God's methods, and that Omniscience alone is capable of determining when and where and why this method should be, or is, applied in the universe.

And the whole result of the argument may be epitomized in the statement: there is "equity" as well as "law" in the government of the Divine Ruler. That is to say, though there is much that takes place in the regular order of events, as phenomena produced by pre-existing phenomena, there must also be cases for which no "precedent" exists, events the like of which never occurred before, ends and purposes that existing causes in the cosmos are not

competent to bring about, contingencies which are not sufficiently provided for by "the established order," and which nevertheless can be met by the introduction of some new condition, the release of some imprisoned energy, a change of the creature's environment, or an expansion of his capacity. God is a law unto Himself. We cannot doubt that He has initiated conditions in the physical universe, and forms of life and mind thereon. Having power to initiate conditions and conscious life, He has power to make changes therein whenever essential to His plan.

CHAPTER VII

ULTRA-ANIMAL EVOLUTION

If philosophy has any desirable message for the world it is a religious one; otherwise, it has nothing that we care for. Science, Art, Æsthetics and Literature supply all other mental needs.

One man can see, with the naked eye, a sixth magnitude star; another can see no star fainter than magnitude five. The reason why we cannot see fainter ones is because our physical well-being does not in the least depend upon seeing any of them. They are no part of our animal environment. It is essential to our bodily well-being that we are able to see as well as we do, and it happens incidentally, and superfluously so far as our animal life is concerned, that this needed power of vision enables us to see *some* stars.

But the human mind does not stop with animal wants; it asks for other things, feels other needs and desires, and strives to supply them. Count the stars in that pretty cluster, the Pleiades, upon a clear winter night. It contains about three thousand. If your eyes are not good, you may see only six; if good, seven;

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if very good, ten or twelve. In either case you have a vague belief that you can almost see others; and you will wish that you could see them, though to do so would not satisfy the least of your bodily wants. The mind alone craves this satisfaction. The craving is purely mental: has not the remotest reference to animal needs.

Science has done good work in classifying and analyzing our physical environments, air, water, minerals, gases, plants, bacteria, and so on; but it has not hitherto spent much time upon our mental or spiritual environment. Science, however, knows that we have purely mental desires. Indeed, Astronomy is useful only for mental gratification. Science also knows that men have religious aspirations—longings to be in communion with God, and for continued existence after death; but it has not striven much to trace these yearnings to the underlying needs without which desire of any kind cannot exist; nor to discover the *environment* without which these ultra-animal traits could not persist.

Desire is born of need, and kept alive by environment. This one sentence embodies the fundamental grounds of animal evolution. The animal is born with certain needs: i.e., there are certain material things which it either cannot live or cannot prosper without. If these

desired things do not exist in the animal's environment it will die if they are essential to life, and the desire will die if life can subsist without them.

Science has not, as yet, evinced as to purely mental and spiritual desires that determination to understand them with which it has examined the analogous phenomena of animal life; nor is it to be condemned for this, because the physical man is not able to take care of himself; the mind must do that, and so the work of science has been directed to this end. As Minot J. Savage remarks, "Science is Man, thinking." It is just a *method* of ascertaining all about ourselves and our environments. It is Man, thinking; and Man ought, and will, continue to think chiefly about those things which affect physical existence and earthly comfort, until that field shall be fully explored and all its secrets exposed to human understanding.

But philosophy will not stop there. Indeed that is where it begins. Its What? and Why? lie in higher planes. It asks, Why do we desire to see the stars? Why do we have spiritual and religious yearnings? Why are these desires persistent? Why do they grow stronger as the human race grows in mental stature and in acquired knowledge?

When philosophy delivers its message to the world—the only one it can give us that is worth

while—it will answer these questions; and when they are answered we shall know that science has already told us certain truths of evolution with which the existence of man's persistent desire for things purely intellectual and spiritual cannot be reconciled without assuming that he has in addition to his animal needs others which are strictly intellectual and spiritual, and an environment, an unseen world, a more persistent verity than that which we cognize through our corporeal senses. Why are we not given the power to *see* that world? Because it is wholly unnecessary to our animal welfare. Why can we not see above the red, and below the violet rays? Why can we not see as many stars with our naked eye as with a telescope? Beyond the range of animal needs man is, as Carl Snyder observes, a Helen Keller, in the material world. He has mind and sense enough for bodily welfare. To see, hear or feel beyond that, he must devise mechanical aids to sense—telescopes, telephones, bolometers, etc. He seems to be an animal, with the needs, desires and environment of animals, but he seems also to be much more than that—having predilections that transcend mere animal life, and having, presumably to say the least, an environment in accord therewith.

Are these ultra-animal traits outside of evolution? On the contrary, we know that evolu-

tion of the human mind was comparatively slow while the animal man was being perfected, but thereafter has proceeded with wonderful rapidity.

Mind-forms in the lower animals do not grow after the animal form becomes finished. Evolution must stop when its work is done, and it ended with the minds of the lower animals when it had perfected their bodies. There was nothing save their material environment that they needed or desired to be in accord with. They evolved such mechanical genius, social inclinations and reasoning powers, as helped them to live their lives *here*. After that, they did not change unless the material world about them changed, so as to necessitate a change in themselves. It is a far stretch of imagination to think that any of them possess aspirations that are purely intellectual or religious. The nearest manifestation they give of any feeling akin to these can be referred to the simple joy of existence, feelings exhibited in their play, and in the songs of birds; even these are useful to their physical natures, the former improving their agility and strength, the latter being a sexual attraction.

We must account for the existence and persistent growth of these ultra-animal traits in man, by presuming that they are in accord with the law of evolution, like all his other desires

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and aspirations. We cannot do this without assuming that there is an environment about him which agrees with, sustains and supplies them, and thus explains why they are stronger now than at the beginning of human history.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERSISTENT

Plato's philosophy was based upon a distinction in duration, but not in *nature*, between the perishable and imperishable,—forms that disappear after a time, and things which endure eternally: phenomena and their *ultimate* material causes, or infinites. The title of the present chapter must not be taken as indicating any such discussion. The transient is perishable, but so also *may* be the persistent. These words signify opposite sides of the idea, endurance. The universal relation thus symbolized in language, of this kind of identity and difference between things, is caused by greater or less agreement of material or ideal forms with their environments, and depends also upon the durability of environment. Rocks are the most enduring material forms. They will not be appreciably affected, during centuries, by conditions which would destroy a cloud in a few minutes. Surrounded by other rocks of like chemical composition, and all at rest, they are in the best possible accord with environment and can endure longest. Atmosphere, moisture and changes of temperature, will shorten

their existence as forms. They may have an environment of heat intense enough to vaporize them in a moment, as happens to meteoric stones when they plunge through the Earth's atmosphere at a velocity of twenty to forty miles per second. The rock illustrates a law manifested in all phenomena, whether belonging to the mineral, vegetable or animal kingdoms, or to the higher realm of ideas. Neither life forms, mind forms, nor ideas, can thrive in environments antagonistic to them. Place a lamb with a flock of sheep and its animal form lasts longer than with a pack of wolves. So with mind forms: put a "lamb" in Wall Street, and his bones are soon bare. His mind cannot contend successfully in this strange environment against minds that have grown into accord with it. Change the environment to art, literature or science, and the tables might be turned—he the giant, they pigmies. Similar phenomena are found in the idea-world: some ideas are short-lived, others endure a long time. But is this, also, due to environment?

"Environment" is a *space* term. We may speak in terms of space about rocks, plants, and animal forms, because they occupy portions of space. In this sense, the cause which makes some ideas more persistent than others, may not be "environment." Yet it is something that answers the same purpose: it is the

ideal environment. An idea will persist only so long as it is believed; therefore, our conceptions of Truth constitute its environment. Suppose, then, that a new idea is presented to people for their acceptance. It happens that its environment is skeptical, so that an idea will not be accepted merely because it is desirable, as if one says: "The soul of man is immortal; I know this because I have seen and conversed with departed spirits"; nor because it is beautiful, as if we are told that "in Calcutta they sell canes that grow the most dainty blossoms while you carry them." Suppose, nevertheless, that these two ideas, each claiming admission to men's judgments by the pass-word, "truth," are presented for acceptance in that skeptical environment. The idea concerning the blossoming canes will vanish instantly. It has no quality of persistence. The one regarding immortality is not so evanescent, because it neither agrees nor disagrees with common experience. It will not be rejected so long as there remains a chance of proving it. The illustration supposes it as "a new idea" in a skeptical environment. It was new ages ago and is still persistent—more really alive than ever, having as its students trained scientists, scrupulous, cautious, highly intelligent and acute observers of phenomena, some of whom, though they began their observations as skept-

tics, have become convinced of its truth. I have suggested a skeptical environment; but skepticism is only a manifestation of love for truth; therefore, the illustrations above given, belonging, as they do, to the universal phenomena of accord and discord with environment, only tend to show that the ultimate environment of an idea is Truth.

The idea of God has in different ages taken various forms to make it accord with the environment of intellectual, moral and spiritual growth in which it lived. But in one respect it has not changed: it has always been an idea of controlling, intelligent, spiritual power. Why has it persisted? It is stronger to-day than it was a few centuries ago, when it was rejected by a narrow, meagerly informed and considerably bigoted scientific world. Science, since then, has so far outgrown its former self, through research in many fields, that its attitude has altered from one of intolerance toward the idea of God into a general consent that the cosmos is asking questions which, if answered at all, must be answered by Religion and Philosophy. And, as to the persistence of these ideas, God and immortality, Philosophy's explanation, however tentative it may be, cannot be truthful unless in accord with the law of evolution. Therefore its answer, *so long as these ideas endure and thrive*, must be that the idea

of God is persistent because there is a God, and the idea of immortality persists because the soul of man is immortal.

CHAPTER IX

INTUITION AND REASON

If we ask ourselves such questions as: Do I exist? Are there such things as Space and Time? Is there a boundary to Space? Can Space be moved? Did Time begin? Will it end? Am I alive? Have I a mind? Can anything occur, or be done, without the lapse of time? Are Love and Hate alike? Are Design and Chance the same idea? Is something nothing? and thousands of questions involving similarity or difference between things known to us, we are aware of no mental process in making truthful answers. We are conscious of the fact that we possess the truth, and that we never learned it. Intuitions are dormant without experience, but when awakened reveal *their own* truths.

To enter into any discussion of the full scope and limits of what may properly be termed Intuition, or Apprehension, as some philosophers prefer to name it, would be foreign to my purpose here. I shall use the name, Intuition, for this *immediate* knowledge which we possess without learning, of the fact that things coming into our consciousness from the

external world, or from the world of thought, are like or unlike each other. I find no fault whatever with Doctor Hyslop's statement: "The consciousness of a color, of a sound, of a taste, of a tactual feeling, of an act of memory, of an act of attention, is an apprehension."¹ But I am interested, here, only in that large class of intuitive truths comprising the categories of Identity and Difference.

Self-evident truths cannot be defined, or imparted from one person to another; nor is there need that they should be, since all people possess them in consciousness. For example: to define Space as infinite adds nothing to the mind's intuitive conception; it only indicates that we are speaking of Space, not of dimensional portions of it. We are told that infinite space cannot be comprehended, but so it is with all self-evident truths. Yet they are obviously true without comprehension. We intuitively know that Space is without limits; that there never has been a moment which did not have its yesterday, and never will be one without its to-morrow. We know that we exist, that we possess life and mind, that things are like or unlike each other. It is impossible that reason or comprehension should make us more aware, or convinced, of any fact than we are of these self-evident truths which reside

¹ "Problems of Philosophy," page 100.

uninvited in our minds. As Sir Wm. Hamilton, a Scotch metaphysician and philosopher of the eighteenth century, says, in his notes upon Reid's Philosophy of Common-Sense: "It will argue nothing against the trustworthiness of Consciousness that all or any of its deliverances are inexplicable or incomprehensible. To make the comprehensibility of a datum of Consciousness a criterion of its truth would be, indeed, the climax of absurdity." And Fiske speaks to the same purpose when he says: "It is indeed a popular misconception that nothing can be known to be true which cannot be demonstrated."

If we could recall all our experiences from the moment of birth, I think they would prove our intuitive knowledge of self-evident truth to be the basis of all our acquired knowledge. I have been led to this conclusion from a careful study of one of the cases described by Doctors Boris Sidis of Harvard and Simon P. Goodhart of Yale, in their very interesting and instructive book, "Multiple Personality."²

Rev. Thomas C. Hanna, twenty-four years of age, was riding in a carriage with his brother. He stopped the horse to adjust something about the harness. Attempting to alight, his feet became entangled in the lap robe and he fell to the ground head foremost. His

² D. Appleton and Company, 1905.

brother picked him up in a state of unconsciousness and took him to the house of a friend where he was placed on a bed. In about two hours he opened his eyes and looked about in an apparently curious and inquisitive way. When spoken to, he did not understand the meaning of the words, though he heard them. He could not answer any questions. The experiences of his past life were totally obliterated from his memory. "*He was as a newly born infant, opening his eyes for the first time upon the world.*" (Page 92.) "Although he was mentally reduced to a state of infancy, strange to say, his intelligence remained intact. His curiosity for acquiring knowledge was keener than ever, and the use made of his acquisitions was truly astonishing. His faculty of judgment, his power of reasoning were as sound and vigorous as ever. The content of knowledge seemed to have been lost, but the form of knowledge remained as active as before the accident and was perhaps even more precise and definite."

In consequence of his matured and trained mind, he learned incomparably faster than an infant does and in six weeks was able to converse intelligently, though far from fluently, upon many subjects. The authors preface their report of their questions and his answers as follows:

"To make clear to the reader the state of Mr. Hanna's mind, we bring here verbatim answers to our questions put to him some six weeks after the accident, when his secondary personality became sufficiently trained and educated to give an account of what had taken place since the injury.

"We had frequently to simplify and elucidate our questions, as Mr. Hanna often failed to understand words and phrases. Mr. Hanna's talk is somewhat incoherent, due to scantiness of his mental content and of his newly acquired vocabulary."

Let us inspect the process by which an infant acquires knowledge, as described by Mr. Hanna. It will be seen that every bit of knowledge he acquired began with innate apprehensions, and chiefly those of identity and difference. I quote from pages 107 to 124. The italics, and interpolations in parentheses, are for the most part my own.

"Q. We want to get from you an account of the very first things you remember of your life?

A. I woke up, and it was at first only *to wonder* how far anything could be. . . . And *while I was thinking, I noticed this movement* that I had when I breathe, and then, when I would think and notice that breathing, it would

be *more slow and irregular*; and so I found that *when* I would think and watch that it would *change* and that I could make it *slow* or *fast*, and I began to breathe very fast. They have told me since that time that that was what frightened them first. But it was just *to see how fast I could breathe*. . . . And all at once my eyes opened. I don't know how it came. I was breathing very fast, and my eyes just came open and then I looked around at everything and found that *my head would turn too when I tried to look*.

Q. When you opened your eyes, did you have an impression of any kind or was your mind a blank?

A. *I don't know that there was anything*. My eyes just were so confused by everything that *I could not tell one thing from another*.

Q. Then everything looked alike to you?

A. Just like one picture against my eyes. If now I could have a great *picture* against my eyes, it would look like that.

Q. Did you see objects, or see colors?

A. Colors. There was not anything like thickness or distance; only colors.

Q. You can see the straightness of this pencil (placing a pencil at some distance from the patient).

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see anything of that kind?

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A. No; they were just alike; all one thing. I would not know whether the pencil was on your face or not. It was all one thing—close to my eyes—just like a painting.”

(Evidently he could see material forms in two dimensions, length and breadth; but not in thickness.)

“Q. What was next after you noticed that you could turn your head?

A. When I would turn my eyes very far, and see all about this picture *I noticed my head would turn too*. Then I began to roll my head very fast, *to see how hard I could turn it*. Then I would turn that hand. Then I threw both hands. They say that was what frightened them worst of all. Everything in the room was all still and quiet. I wanted to see *how much* I could move my hand. Then there was something here that *changed*, that *moved*. Of course, I know now what it was. I thought it was something that my hand had done that made it move. It was really Dr. St——n, near the door. I put out my hand and tried to move it, but *found that I didn't touch it*; I got up and went farther and farther *to make it move*. The movement surprised me. I thought *my hand* must have done it, *but I did not move my hand any then*. That was the first time I *separated* my movement from that of others, when he moved the first time *with-*

out my moving him. It was all very strange. It was such an experience. The first I knew of external movement at all was *when he moved*, and then I didn't have it clear in my mind. The first that I was really sure that there was something besides me was when Dr. O. *jumped on me*. Then I was sure there was something *against me*.

Q. But before you thought it was yourself?

A. Yes. *But I thought I didn't know it all.* I thought there must be some part that I didn't know; but it was very hard because I was so much *surprised* at everything each second that I wanted to think all about that—*what it could be and what it could not be*; and then the next second there would be *something else* I wanted to think about, and it was very hard to get all these things in my mind, and to think of them orderly after they jumped at me."

When a few hours after the accident, he, from curiosity, got out of bed and reached out toward one of the attendants in an effort to touch him, four of them, after a severe struggle, overpowered him and tied his hands behind his back, thinking him delirious.

(Speaking of hearing people talk and observing the consequences, he says):

"I had seen that when one of them would

make these noises (patient refers to speech) that another would know just what to do; so *I saw by that* they could understand each other, and I thought it would be *good for me to learn*, and so I tried to learn. I knew then that they had some way of *communication*, of talking; and I knew that Mr. C. was *very kind*, and I thought these others *were bad*. And so I wanted to talk *to him*.

Q. How do you know he was kind?

A. He was trying to take these off, and the doctors would come and take his hand away, and at last, when they were out of the room, he took them (ropes) off."

(He inferred Mr. C's. kindness from the *difference* between his and the doctor's actions. He observed a *similarity* of results when people spoke to each other—that "those noises" were followed by movements on the part of the persons spoken to.)

"Q. What was the first thing you learned; do you remember?

A. You mean the first words? The first thing I did was to repeat aloud whatever sentences I had heard people say, that I could remember; every one that I could remember. I did not know anything what they meant. I thought perhaps that I could learn to talk that way by saying what other people said.

Q. You repeated what they said?

A. Yes; I repeated them without understanding the sense. I would say the same as they did. Anywhere in the house that I could hear words I would say them afterward. But *it did not do any good*; I could not learn to talk at all. . . . So Friday afternoon (the day after the accident) I stopped talking—saying those sentences—because *I saw that I could not learn to talk any better that way*. And I was feeling then very discouraged, because *people laughed at me*.

Q. Why were you discouraged?

A. Because it did not make *any difference* to them (the people)."

(Here he discovered his mistake, by apprehending a difference between the results of his own talk and that of other people.)

"Q. Can you recall any sentences which you at that time repeated without knowing the meaning of the words?

A. Mr. S. said words like these: 'Do you want me to come?' That is the best I can remember. And Dr. O. said: 'Course, you fool.'

Q. But you did not understand what it meant?

A. No; the accident, they tell me, happened Thursday night, and I began to learn to speak late Friday afternoon.

Q. How many sentences had you repeated?

A. I think as many as thirty or forty.

Q. For how many days?

A. For two days. Saturday before noon was the first time that I learned any word with its real meaning. Saturday—before dinner. I could only tell times by *daylight and the lamplight*, and by the *three meals*. That was all I knew about time then.

Q. When you learned the meaning of the first word were you still repeating sentences?

A. Oh, yes; I had begun to repeat sentences again Friday night and Saturday morning; but Friday afternoon and evening I had stopped because it did not seem any good to me at all; and then I thought it was very foolish to lie there and do nothing, and not work at all, to have people understand me. And so I began again to repeat these sentences. And then Saturday morning I felt a great deal worse about it, and so I began to try to act as if I wanted to talk all I could, and that is the time that Miss A. saw what I wanted to do. She got an apple from the table, and held the yellow apple up to me and said 'apple' plainly three times.

Q. And you repeated it?

A. Yes; after she made the motion very clearly with her mouth and I said it after her; and she showed me it was all right.

Q. How did she show it?

A. *She smiled, and nodded her head.*

Q. Did you understand?

A. Yes; I could tell by *the motions* people made to each other; the *way* they nodded and *the way* they would motion with their hands."

(He apprehended a *difference* between these "motions," which he correctly interpreted as assent and dissent.)

"Q. How did you learn to know distance?

A. A picture I saw across the room *did not seem* farther than a clock near by. So I thought I would reach out and feel it, but *I could not reach it*, and I reached farther and farther. I did not want to get up any more, because *I had found* they did not want me to get up; and so I thought I must not now. And so I just reached as far as I could. And even after I knew something about distance, I stretched out my hand to reach distant things."

(He apprehended the difference between a thing which he could reach and one that was out of reach, and thus inferred the fact of distance.)

"Q. How did you learn the difference between a picture and a living human being?

A. Well, *they could move*, and they had *different shape*, you know, from the picture. The picture was *smooth*, if you tried the picture.

Q. How did you know the difference between yourself and other people?

A. When Dr. O. was there Thursday night, then I knew that there were others, but I did not know of myself. It was Sunday before I really could see persons, but I always thought I was something different, because people were always either standing or walking, and they were always dressed up, *and I was not*. I did not think I was a person at all until Mr. Sh. told me.

Q. Did you find any difference between yourself and other people?

A. *Yes and that was why I began to think about it.*

Q. When you saw your hand, did you know it belonged to yourself?

A. *Yes; because I could move this; I could control this.*

Q. But at the beginning did you know the difference between your hands and the hands of other people?

A. No; there were not any other people in the beginning. But really there were so many things; it was really when I began to look at all these colors *separately* that I saw so much."

(He was so confused at the outset by such a multitude of objects never seen before, that he could not reason about them separately. As he had already stated, "My eyes were so confused by everything that I could not tell one

thing from another." His first thought was that everything he saw was part of himself.)

"Q. What was the hardest for you to express?

A. The hardest of all was to get them to understand that I wanted something that *was very much like something I knew*. For instance: I was very hungry then, because they were afraid to give me anything, and I wanted to eat something, and the only thing I knew was 'apple.' But I did not want apple. It was hard for me to tell them. I had to say 'apple,' and said it many times, and when they would bring it and offer me a little piece, I did not want it. *I had taken other things*; they had given me toast and milk, but I did not know the names of them. *After they had given me three or four things I began to think there were other things to eat, too*, and I wanted to know the names of all those things. If I had only known the word 'food' or 'dinner' or 'eat' or any of those words.

Q. How did you learn other words?

A. The first I learned was 'be careful.' I asked them what that meant 'be careful'—and they tried to tell me, but they had to give it up. They could not make it clear to me, until at last Miss A. was setting down a vase of flowers, which was very full of water, and Mrs. C. told her to be careful, and I could see my-

self that it was *in danger of tipping*, and I could see what it meant.

(Father.) I made a special effort to get him to understand the idea of the pronoun. That was a hard thing. I had a good deal of an effort to teach him the meaning of pronouns. Instead of saying 'Thomas' or 'Tom,' as most of the attendants and visitors did, I tried to work into his mind the idea of the 'I' or 'you,' and succeeded at last. (Mr. Hanna up to this time, imitating others, spoke of himself as 'Tom,' not understanding the use of pronouns.)

Q. How did you learn the meaning of the words 'good,' 'bad,' for instance?

A. At first, when I would eat an apple, I would eat the whole of it—the core and the stem. The next time when I would try to eat the core, *they would make a face and take it away*. And then they gave me a cake of soap. I thought that was to eat and put that to my mouth; and *they took that away*, and said, 'Bad, bad,' *and made a face*, and that was how I learned the meaning of bad and good.

Q. What was it you told me of the 'white black-hen'?

A. A hen of a black color was pointed out to me and called a black hen, and I thought that 'black hen' was the name of the animal. At

last they let the other chickens out later, and there happened to be a white hen, and as I knew the color white, I said 'white black-hen.' They told me that the name of *the animal* was hen, and black was *the color*.

Q. When you saw for the first time your father, or mother, or Miss C., or others of your friends and acquaintances, did you have any feeling of ever having seen them before?

A. No; I had to learn them all over again."

(Miss C. was the young lady to whom he was betrothed.)

"Q. Did you have any feeling of liking or attraction for your parents or Miss C. different than you had for others?

A. No; the only thing I knew about father when he came was that *everyone was waiting*.

Q. How long after the accident was that?

A. (By father.) Just about thirteen hours.

Q. You say you noticed the anxiety of people around you?

A. People were coming in and going out all the time, but they had been just *people they had not looked for, or expected or waited for*. I saw that *by the way they acted* that papa was someone that I ought to think a great deal about.

Q. How did you learn your relationship to your parents?

A. Mr. Sh. explained to me that everything must have parents, and I could understand that Mr. and Mrs. C. were *very different* to their daughter and to their son from what they were to other people; and the best I had to explain it to me was when I went out of doors and saw little chickens with the hen. I could understand a great deal better what was meant. They told me it was a *mother hen*.

Q. How did you notice the difference between a thing alive and not alive?

A. *Because they move*. It was hard for me to understand about trees. The branches and leaves *were moving*. I thought they were alive.

Q. What did you think of horses and carriages?

A. I thought it was all the same animal. Then when I got out into the other rooms *I saw wagons alone*. I saw they were *different*."

The foregoing extracts comprise practically all Mr. Hanna's description of the process whereby knowledge came to him, except what he says about learning to read and write, and play upon musical instruments—banjo, piano and organ. He intuitively apprehended the differences between the sounds of spoken words, and was taught that these differences had their counterparts in meaning. This knowledge gave him some truths of identity to help out his intuition of differences in the shapes of

written, or printed, words, when he was learning to read. He had an acute intuition of harmony, and this with identities and differences in the sounds produced by fingering, was the basis of his newly acquired knowledge of music.

Under the expert treatment of Doctors Sidis and Goodhart, Mr. Hanna, after some months, was able to recall the incidents of both lives, thus uniting this new personality with the old one. The process whereby the doctors accomplished his cure is intensely interesting, but foreign to my purpose here.

The indispensableness of Mr. Hanna's intuitive knowledge of the truths of identity and difference, as a foundation for his reason to work upon in acquiring inferential truths, is obvious from his statement of the facts. The office of reason in connection with these intuitions, is also plainly to be seen.

But it must be remembered that Reason is the servant of Truth and of Error. It does its work faithfully and accurately, in whichever service it is employed. It cannot act upon its own initiative. More than any other mental faculty, it resembles a perfect machine. It is the *mental machine*. Like a grist-mill, it turns out only what is put into it. The grist may, therefore, be error, ignorance or truth. Thus, using the deductive process:

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| I. | <i>Major premise.</i> | Matter has mind. |
| | <i>Minor premise.</i> | Wind is a form of matter. |
| | <i>Conclusion.</i> | Winds have minds. |
| II. | <i>Major premise.</i> | Matter has not mind. |
| | <i>Minor premise.</i> | Wind is a form of matter. |
| | <i>Conclusion.</i> | Winds have not minds. |

It is the same with inductive reasoning—the sort mostly used in science. In this we reverse the process—reasoning from particulars to generals:

I. I am a member of the human family. I know that some things are like each other and others are not—that there are identities and differences. This knowledge enters into my every thought and act. By its help I am able to choose my lines of conduct toward my environment—toward persons and things outside of myself. When left to myself I make my choice and act in accordance thereto. This ability to recognize identities and differences, and to select from them what I desire to have, to think, or do, I call *mind*. From all my own experience, and from all human testimony, I am convinced that other men when left to themselves think and act from choice, as I do; and as I could not do this without mentality which enables me to recognize identities and differ-

ences, I am convinced that all other men have this gift, mind, since they all behave just as it enables and compels me to behave.

II. I am able to choose my course of behavior. If I have a building which I want to get out of the way, to make room for a better one, I can either burn it, blow it up with dynamite, get it moved away to some other place, take it to pieces and scatter the materials hither and thither, or pile them up in orderly fashion. Whichever method I decide upon, it is my mind that makes the choice. The winds can and do take down buildings, but always they do this the same way—scattering the material. Could they choose a better way? The only proof I have that other men have this power of choosing that I have is that I see them using it—making choice between different things, and different methods. My mind *compels* me to choose; their minds must compel them to choose. Being so compelled, the method I should adopt in clearing my lot would depend upon what I wanted to do with the old building standing upon it. If I desired it for use in another place I would have it moved there. I would act in one way if I wanted to use the old material, or some of it, in a new structure, and in a different way if I wanted to use it for kindling wood. Other men are similarly governed in their choosing, and the consequence is

that they do not always behave the same. As the winds never use this power of choice, but always act as if they did not possess it, I cannot believe that they have minds.

We should not have been able to take the first step in either of the foregoing cases of inductive reasoning, had we not the light of a truth to start with—a truth of “*identity*” in the first; in the second a truth of “*difference*.” We knew before we began reasoning, that there is *likeness* and *unlikeness* between material forms, mental forms, lines of conduct, in short all things. Reason did not give us those truths nor could it have moved a step without them. We knew another truth without which we could not have begun to reason in either case—that to make choice is a *mental* act. Reason did not, and could not, give us that truth. It came directly from our inner consciousness. We are conscious of our mental acts, and therefore that we possess minds. When we make a choice, we know this to be an act of the mind.

But where, and how, do we obtain truths like these—identity, difference, the fact of self-consciousness, truths that do not come from reason, experience, or demonstration—truths which, as Fiske puts it, “underlie and precede all demonstration,” “ultimate facts in consciousness,” as Spencer calls them? Whence does “consciousness” obtain these truths? All

good things that we possess, and which we are not able to trace to any other source, we feel compelled to attribute directly to God, or to some spiritual intelligence in His service, until we find some other cause for them which enables us to see Him farther in the back-ground:

“ Behind the dim unknown,
Keeping watch above his own.”

CHAPTER X

MIND AND LAW

As "law" means the *regularity* with which identical effects follow from identical causes, it is impossible to think that it can be absent in space or time, or in any thinkable condition, since it is unthinkable that unlike effects should come from causes in all respects alike. This being an impossible conception, we are forced to assume that we shall always be under "the reign of law," whatever part of space we may be translated to, whatever period of time we may exist in, whatever our environment may at any time be, whatever changes may take place in ourselves. "Law," therefore, must exist everywhere, in the inorganic kingdom, in the organic kingdom, in mind, in the products of mind—ideas, thoughts—in all life, vegetable and animal. Everywhere and always, like causes will produce like effects.

But in the mineral and vegetable kingdoms "law" is manifested by all things behaving in fixed, unchosen ways, while in the animal kingdom mind is compelled to make choice between alternatives, and law shows itself in this compulsion, and in the fact that action is *always*

in accordance with choice unless coerced or hindered by some collateral cause.

The ability to detect identities and differences, and to choose between them, enters into the manifestation of all laws of mind. Choice depends upon the individual, but its variations determine the *directions* in which law shall be manifested after choice has been made—in other words, the effect of choice, as a *cause*, in any given case. To a limited extent, mind can do this in the material world. It may, for instance, increase the length and caliber of a gun, and the quantity of explosive, thus strengthening motion in its contest with gravitation. But some physical phenomena lie entirely beyond human interference, so that choice, as to them, can result only in measures of protection or escape.

When the power of effective choice exists it will become a *cause*, if exercised. We can choose to act in a certain way and thereby alter results that would inevitably follow from conditions if left alone; we can choose to act differently and vary the result, or to do nothing and let things take their course; so that here we find no law of mind manifested save in the fact that we are compelled to choose between action and inaction. Our consciousness of the power of choice, and our intuitive cognition of the fact of difference, compel us, not to make

one choice or another, but to perform the mental act of choosing, almost every moment of our lives.

Two conditions exist everywhere—Inertia and Motion. From their alternative demands we can never escape in the realms of matter and mind. Matter must be in motion or at rest because there exists no intermediate condition; mind must choose to act or remain inactive, since no other condition is possible but these two. Up to the very consummation of a decision, choice is free. If we postpone action, it is only giving inertia a further term of trial or toleration. Thus ultimately it always comes to the laws manifested in compulsion to choose between motion and inertia, and to act in accordance with choice. These laws are not confined to mankind; they apply to all mind. A hungry dog sees a piece of wood, knows that he can gnaw it but that it is utterly valueless as food, and chooses to let it alone. He comes upon a good bone, knows the difference, and chooses to gnaw the bone. In both cases he was, by these laws of mind, compelled to elect between gnawing and not gnawing, because the alternatives being presented to his mind, there was no escape from their demand for a decision.

Every conscious act begins with choice. Impressions from outside may reach us without our choice, or even against it; but if we act

consciously upon them we first choose what to do. We may, from repeated experience, make this mental act of choosing so *easy*, and thus pass from one act to another so rapidly, that separate impressions seem not to be left upon consciousness, but all are blended, apparently, into one act of memory. An instance of this is seen in piano playing of very rapid music by an expert. So swift is the succession of separate acts, in touching the keys, that the performer may be almost deceived into thinking them to be unconscious. But if he reflects upon the fact that he can play a piece of music that he has never seen before as rapidly as one that he plays from memory, and that in order to play this new piece he must first read each note and then play it, his reason compels him to decide that each act is a conscious one, that as he comes to each note he chooses between playing it and not playing it; moreover, he knows that he can stop at any moment if he so elects.

Thus we may see that the "determinist" has a truth in his philosophy, albeit one that he misjudges. Our acts are compelled. Choice is not only a compelling agent, but is itself compelled, far enough to make election between action and inaction compulsory. Our knowledge of the truths of identity and difference forces us to choose. But if

we should eliminate any word from this proposition, as failing to express the whole truth, should it not be the word "compelled," rather than the word "choose"? We are compelled *by ourselves*. But this is not compulsion in the true sense. All compulsion that has any right to be so called must come from outside, not from within ourselves. Our will is not free to choose something that is neither action nor inaction, because there is no such something, and to choose what is unthinkable is impossible, as thought must precede choice. We cannot choose to do, or get, what appears impossible. Our ideals—the choices we would make, if feasible, are higher than our achievements can possibly be.

What freedom of will really means, then, is freedom to choose things that are possible, feasible, thinkable, or known. Yet this apparently limited freedom of choice has, inchoate, all the active potentialities of Deity, limited alone by our knowledge, our ability to think, and our intuitions. What we do not know about, and what is unthinkable to us, we cannot wish for. These limitations upon choice are not limitations in any true sense. To be prevented from choosing that which is impossible, or unthinkable is no restriction. We do not consider God as "limited," though this sort of choice can be no more within His power than

ours. He cannot, any more than man, choose to neither act nor remain inactive. Like man, He must be compelled to choose one or the other of these two, and for the same reason—because will compels choice, and there are only these two to be chosen from.

A short-sighted ethical view of the subject is embodied, sometimes, in the question: Why, under precisely similar conditions, does A do the evil and B the good? Clearly the question assumes an impossibility: something contrary to the “laws of laws”—that like causes and conditions are followed by like effects. The personalities of A and B enter into the case. The difference between them causes the difference in their choosing, and is the most potent condition of all. The “law” is therefore necessarily manifested in unlike results. As evolution brings A up to the present moral standard of B, A’s choice will change more and more toward the good. But perhaps A is not to blame for being less worthy than B. This suggestion involves a more real ethical question. Usually, we are not responsible for strong differences between ourselves and others; accidents of birth, or environment, are their chief causes. Absolutely identical conditions would have produced absolutely identical men. Then, do not the conditions that caused A to be what he is, compel him to choose evil oftener than B does?

If we think about this, we shall see that the real question is not the one asked, but a much larger one; the entire condition has not been taken into account; we have been looking for a half truth. We have been reasoning from the fact that A was not made like B; but, really, that is only a very small part of the whole condition, as we shall see if we begin our inquiry in a different way:

A, though not so very good, is better than Nero was. Why was not Nero made as good as A? Let us compare B with himself at different periods. He is perhaps a better man in every way at fifty than he was at twenty-five. Why was he not made as good at twenty-five as he has grown to be at fifty? And why is he not as valuable an item in the Universe at fifty as he promises to be a thousand or ten thousand years later, supposing him to be immortal? If we reflect, all these questions resolve themselves at last into one—an absurd sort of question—Why does evolution exist? Why was not all made perfect to begin with? Now, assuming that it was possible for God to make everything perfect, so that there would be nothing for man to do, nothing to learn, nothing to achieve, and therefore nothing to make him happy, we should thank God that instead of ordering things in that way He chose the better method of evolution. Yet, we have not

even to thank God for that if the choice He was compelled to make was not between perfection and evolution, but between evolution and nothing—between action and inaction. Atrophy invariably follows disuse of faculties, mental or physical; this is a manifestation of “law,” and therefore inevitable. “Perfection,” were it possible, could not last more than a moment because there would be no evil to overcome, no good to be done, nothing to strive for, no knowledge to be acquired, no character to be improved. It would therefore be immediately followed by mental inertia and the inevitable consequence, atrophy; so that the next moment after the point of perfection was reached the world would be imperfect again, and thus the grateful task of making things better would be changed into the tiresome labor of keeping them as good as they are. Ideal happiness is not in lack of desire, but in opportunity for achievement. Stones are not happy.

“Determinism” is a strange mental phenomenon. How do learned men who move from place to place every day of their lives, conscious that in so doing they are exercising free will, reason themselves into a belief that free will is an entire delusion? Can they not see that it is only restricted? Were it not for freedom of will, mental, moral and spiritual, evolution would be as impossible and inconceiv-

able in a man as in a machine; therefore, the "Determinist" could not have come into existence but for the very fact which he refuses to believe.

Yet, the scope of free will is much circumscribed. On the one hand, desire easily transcends it in tales like the "Arabian Nights"; on the other, all pervading material causes must be circumvented by "skyscrapers," airships, ventilators, filters, artificial heat and light, refrigerators, and other devices which extend the "jail limits." From cradle to grave, we are environed by "Causes" and "laws." No wonder this fog of impossibilities gave rise to the mental hallucination of "Determinism."

But we are absolutely free to act or remain inactive, to move intelligently or to drift, to strive or die. Does this seem a trifle? Let us look upon human achievement before we answer. It is much; if we had more, we could not keep with us that greatest and best of all friends, under God—the angel of evolution. She loves not the tramp, drone, or "gentleman of leisure"; but to the immortal who chooses to be a toiler, striver, and doer, she adds the greatest of all blessings—eternal growth into higher intellectual, moral and spiritual selfhood.

CHAPTER XI

A DUAL COSMOS

We may feel indifferent as to whether a theory be called Monism or Dualism, since mere names cannot give us a reliable notion of what theories mean.

My own belief is that Cause, in so far as it is intelligent, is monistic, but that it could not exist if there were not other things besides itself, and therefore the Cosmos is, of necessity, dualistic. There are not gods, nor demons. There is *one* God, but besides Him there are other things, and, because of these, He has tasks to do, difficulties to overcome, feelings, love, dislike, joy, sorrow, disappointment, satisfaction; in short, all the vast aggregate of truth comprised within the categories of Reality, Identity and Difference. Having all truth, He has each part. From Him we must derive that intuition of the fact of likeness and unlikeness between ideas, and between other things, which makes it possible for us to choose between them. This truth comes from somewhere—is somehow caused to reside in our consciousness. It is of the class—self-evident

truths—that cannot be proved, taught or learned, as shown in a former chapter.

Does not God possess, within His consciousness, this truth? Are we greater than He is in this respect? Preposterous thought! Yet what use can the God of Idealism make of this truth? If we believe that our consciousness of identity and difference gives *us* truth, how can we conceive that what is truth for us is falsehood for God? Like the Eternal, to whose kingdom it belongs, Truth is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. It is not one thing now, and to be a different thing later on. It is not one thing upon this earth and an unlike thing on some other planet, or elsewhere in space. We cannot conceive Truth as fluctuating or changing, for that would be a conception that it does not exist. It is not always easily recognized, as are these self-evident truths. Intuition leaves us to our own devices in searching for truths that are not self-evident. And I doubt there being any better criterion for their identification than the one which Jesus gives us—"By their fruits ye shall know them." And that is the test commended by the Pragmatic philosophy. But this much Intuition tells us about Truth: what it ought to be, and must be, when it is found. We can be deceived; there could be no truth without its potential opposite—deception. But if we

are deceived as to what the truth is, this is not the result of error in our intuition of what it should be.

God is undoubtedly the possessor of all truths which man has in consciousness, including that greatest and most fundamental of all—the truth of identity and difference. But what use does He make of this latter? To man, it is helpful in making choice between things. Can we conceive it as being useful to God for any other purpose than this? If to Him all things are, as Idealists tell us, parts of His very self-hood, and, therefore, good, nothing is left for Him to choose, and this truth is, to Him, false. Between good and good there is no choice: they are identical. Between good and less good there is choice, because the act of rejecting the greater good and choosing the less, is an evil act. All necessary things are not of equal importance. A vegetable may not be as good a thing as a human being, but it may be a necessary thing nevertheless. Therefore it would be foolish to accuse God for not confining Himself to the one task of improving mankind. But if God sets before Himself a task, He knows that it can be done in a certain way; also, perhaps, in a certain other and *better* way; and, it may be, in a certain other *best* way. The truths of identity and difference make Him conscious of

this; therefore it is unthinkable that He ever chooses a way which is not the best, for that would be an evil choice, even though some good might come from it. Thus conscience compels us to judge our own behavior. If alternative courses of conduct are presented to us and are equally feasible, and if we know that one of them will result in much good, the other in a little good, yet, knowing all this, we deliberately choose the latter, conscience is not satisfied, and what it condemns is not the little good, but our evil action in choosing it instead of the greater good.

Idealists confute materialism by attempting to convince us that God is directly and purposely the cause of all phenomena and all reality; that therefore He is either the *cause* of Matter, Inertia, Time and Space, or else these infinite things are, each and all, parts of Him; or they are modes by which He manifests Himself. (Just try to think of an infinite *manifestation*—an infinite finite), or else none of these things really exist at all, and our belief that they do is to be accounted for in this way or that, according to the differing views of Idealistic teachers.

In order to give us their idea of a God unlimited and unconditioned, not only able to do all things, but the actual doer of them all, they have been constrained to put human nature,

external nature, and everything material and ideal, good and bad, into Him, as parts of His nature. In short they have so conditioned God, in their conception of Him, that He needs no intelligence or power, since outside of Himself there exists nothing to be done, chosen, considered, loved or opposed; nothing which in any conceivable way could be an occasion for the exercise of intelligence or power. If there be anything which seems to need improvement it is a something which is, like all things, a part of Him, and He being perfect, all parts of Him must be already perfect, so that we must be mistaken in our ideas of reforming things. Moreover, they tell us He is infinite, spatially and otherwise. But the infinite cannot change or be changed, since that would imply enlargement or diminishment.

Give us back the crudely anthropomorphic sermons of a century or more ago, if we can replace them by nothing better than this all-wise, all-powerful, and all-good nonentity. Maybe those sermons gave us only a half loaf, a quarter, or even a crumb of the bread of life. It was *bread*; better than nothing. And we had much, besides, which could not be taken from us: the "Lord's prayer"; the life, example and words of Jesus, and the knowledge that it was He, the Founder of our Christian Religion, who held the ideas that God is a

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“Father” and “*Worker*”; also, we had our common sense, though we were, and still are, economical of it, and afraid that it cannot be profitably applied in Religion, even though we must admit it to be a gift from God. A strange intellectual paradox, this!

Science teaches us, among many other inductive truths, these:

1. Evolution exists in the universe. In the physical world, and in the world of ideas, there is a constant process of *change* going on. It is a process of growth—of enlargement and, upon the whole, improvement. However, for the purposes of the present point, it is immaterial whether we take the pessimist’s or the optimist’s view. It suffices that the process is one of *change*.

2. Physical and mental faculties or powers which are not used become atrophied—dwindle, grow weaker. Each *thriving* faculty, quality or trait of a plant or animal is useful, helpful and needful to its possessor, because there is always something in its environment which makes such faculty, quality or trait, essential to its possessor’s well-being.

Science having discovered these inductive truths, and sanctioned them by such a show of evidence that we feel constrained to believe them, asks Idealism to reconcile its idea of God with this portion of Him—Nature—which

is constantly changing. Science confronts Idealism with the alternative of giving an explanatory answer to this, or of abandoning the claim that this ever-changing thing is any part of the never-changing God.

Science asks Idealism if God violates His own laws of evolution by preserving in His consciousness the truths of identity and difference, though He has never had any use for them. Science asks Idealism this further question: What is there that makes it useful or essential to God that He should possess the truths of identity and difference, the intelligence to choose between alternatives, and the power to act according to choice? Science knows of no purpose for which these powers could be made useful except to bring their possessor into better accord with environment; but Idealism asserts that God has no environment—that all things are parts of Him.

And to these questions Idealism naïvely answers: "We must not attempt to judge God by human or finite standards. He could undoubtedly answer your questions, but you could not understand the answer. It is a knowledge to which you can never attain, for you are finite and God is infinite. The finite cannot understand the Infinite."

I beg the Idealists' pardon, but they seem to think they have found out a good deal

about God. They tell us that He is wise and powerful, loving and good. How did they learn these qualities of the Infinite? How did they comprehend or understand what they meant? Are not Idealists finite, and yet able to understand much about God? Can Love exist without an object of love? Can wisdom exist if there are no difficulties to be met by using it?

This answer of Idealism is not even as much as begging the question; it is evasion. What shall we say, then, of this Idealistic Du Bois Reymond guide, who accompanies us to the parting of the ways and, nonchalantly waving his hand toward the labyrinth, exclaims, "*Ignoramus; ignorabimus!*" We do not know; we shall never know, sit down and make yourself comfortable?" How be comfortable, unless we rot, or become fossils? Happily for us, Science, "Man thinking," is not the sort to take that advice. It will continue to ask the question, and to seek an answer; it will knock and keep on knocking. The door will be opened. It is already being opened by the method of science—the inductive method; and by that I mean to say that we have reversed the process pursued in the past; we do not first postulate God, and reason from Him down to man. We postulate man and nature, and reason from them up to God. Science can pursue no other

course than this, for it must always begin with things that are absolutely *known*; and Philosophy, through a study of these, proceeds back to truths not previously apprehended.

I am going to close this chapter with a quotation from the world-renowned scientist, Sir Oliver Lodge's book, "Life and Matter," pages 65 *et seq.*

"If the Deity has a sense of humor, as undoubtedly He has, He must be amused at the remarkable philosophizing faculty recently developed by the creature which on this planet has become most vigorously self-conscious and is in the early stages of progress towards higher things—a philosophizing faculty so acute as to lead him to mistrust and throw away information conveyed to him by the very instruments which have enabled him to become what he is; so that, having become keenly alive to the truth that all we are directly aware of is the fruit of our own sensations and consciousness, he proceeds to the grotesque supposition that these sensations and consciousness may be all that really exists, and that the information which for ages our senses have conveyed to us concerning external things may be illusory, not only in form and detail and appearance, but in substantial fact.

"He must be pleased, also, with the enter-

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prise of those eager philosophers who are so strenuously impressed with the truth of some ultimate monistic unification, as to be unwilling to concede the multifariousness of existence; who decline to speak of mind and matter, or of body and spirit, or of God and the world, as in any sense separate entities; who stigmatize as dualistic anything which does not manifestly and consciously strain after an ultimate monistic view; and who then, as a climax, on the strength of a few years' superficial experience on a planet, by the aid of the sense organs which they themselves perceive to be illusory whenever the actual reality of things is in contemplation, proceed to develop the theory that the whole has come into being without direct intelligence and apart from spiritual guidance, that it is managed so well (or so ill) that it is really not managed at all, that no Deity exists, and that it is absurd to postulate the existence of a comprehensive and all-inclusive guiding Mind."

"If the Deity has a sense of humor, as undoubtedly He has!" Here is "Anthropomorphism" to give the weakling theism of some people a shock, indeed: people who absent-mindedly hold a faith that logically elevates them above the Deity, denying to Him faculties, powers, mental and moral riches, which they possess themselves. But the Christian world is coming to a vigorous, earnest and rea-

sonable conception of God, as any one may know who studies the sermons and religious books of the day. More and more often do we hear such expressions from noted divines, as Doctor Funk's, "There is *pain in the Father's heart* until the wanderer returns"; and Doctor Knight's, "God enters into all our sorrows and pains so fully that *He suffers exactly as we do.*"

CHAPTER XII

LIFE AND DEATH

For the purposes of the present volume, Life and Death will be considered together, and simply accepted as facts, questioning only their uses in the universe.

Death is a phenomenon of the most transient nature possible. It is no more enduring than the sound of its name. A living body one moment is dead the next.

The phenomenon of earthly life must seem an extremely ephemeral thing to the Creator. Even when viewed from the standpoint of human desire it is insignificant. Considered temporally, life and death are mere trifles in duration. As a French poet says:

La vie est breve:	Life is brief;
Un peu d'espoir,	A little hope,
Un peu de reve—	A little dream,
Et puis—bon soir!	And then—good night.

Or, if I might venture to clothe the same thought in my own phrase, life, "if this be all, and naught beyond the grave," is but:

An infant's cry
A pang, a throb,
A hope, a sob,
A word—"good-by."

Such is the appearance of these phenomena, life and death, viewed temporally. Let us look at them from the stand-point of utility. Life at once commends itself as an inestimable prize could we possess it long enough to accomplish the work we are fitted for; to find the truths we long for; to obtain the knowledge that we wish but have no time to find; to enjoy to the uttermost our friendships, our loves, our ideals. In brief, life is the most wonderful of possible blessings *potentially*, provided it could be enduring. But if earth life is all, then, even if it be a necessity in the total of God's grand scheme of evolution, now as in ante-human days, how sad must be our Father's heart, that He can accomplish the ultimate good only by imposing upon His helpless creatures this cruel mockery of hope. Then, indeed, does the great Persian poet and pessimist speak excusably:

"One moment in Annihilation's waste,
One moment of the well of Life to taste,
I came like water and like wind I go
Into the Universe, and Why not knowing,
Nor Whence—like water willy-nilly flowing;

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And out of it, as wind along the Waste,
I know not whither—willy-nilly blowing.
Without my asking, hither hurried—Whence?
And, without asking Whither? hurried hence
Ah, contrite Heav'n endowed us with the Vine
To drug the memory of that insolence.

Let us not make the blunder of looking to the words alone for the real philosophical question suggested by Omar's complaint. It lies much deeper—in that yearning for immortality, of a soul, expressing its disappointment in this pitiable protest. Herein the Persian poet was only a normal man, voicing a universal human aspiration and the same scorn of ephemeral life that Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Macbeth:

. . . . "Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow; a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by any idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing."

Nor can we escape this dilemma of thought, through a materialism which, if true, could only mitigate the case by relieving us from the nightmare of an overruling Intelligence whom we must either pity or blame for our futile desire to live after death. Yet, are we not more

comfortable with the Materialists, who at least are manly and brave, than with those chicken-hearted philosophers who, refusing to *concede* annihilation, yet attempt to console us for its *possibility* by counting up pleasures in the present life which have fallen to their own lot but are denied to most people? The great majority of us have hitherto found our chief happiness in the mere joy of living, which more than compensates for lives of sorrow, privation and poorly recompensed toil. Yet this joy of living is the cause of our becoming more and more attached to life, and therefore it sharpens the cruelty of annihilation.

Let us look where we may, then, we have only two alternative explanations of annihilation, if it be a fact:

First—A God struggling hopelessly against insurmountable obstacles:

Second—God driven from the universe. Humanity in the clutch of the victorious Ahri-man, Satan, or whatever he may be called.

Either of these propositions would fully explain death, considered as an absolute extinction of life, because they assume that the universe is a chaos. In contrast with them how grandly reasonable is the answer of Christianity to the riddle of death. Adopting that answer, what transcendent usefulness we see in this most evanescent of all phenomena. “O

death, where is thy victory? O grave, where is thy sting?" "There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." "Death is translation from mortal to immortal life." *Death is the only possible means whereby immortal spirits can be multiplied.*

Evolution deals with all forms. Through its process, some species of animals have been finished and are therefore dead, or dying; others are to be finished, and will therefore die; *one* can never be finished, and therefore can never die, for evolution cannot abandon that which is unfinished.

If there exists in the animal kingdom a mental form whose mission appears to be the acquisition of knowledge and truth concerning things that do not affect its physical well-being, it seems an unavoidable conclusion that such form must be immortal. For the range of search and inquiry in the fields of truth and knowledge is illimitable, bounded only by infinite time and space. Growth in the evolution of such a form is the result of activity and endeavor in that search, and is the constant cause of increased capacity therefor. Hence evolution can never abandon such a form.

Among living forms existing upon our own planet, there appears to be none outside of man that agrees with this description—none other

that seems to be formed for the purpose of investigating ultra-animal truths, and so constituted that it is compelled to follow the paths of inquiry and pursuit held out by the world of idea. The interests of all others seem to begin and end with animal existence and welfare. Human interest in these higher things which have no uses in "the struggle for life" constitute an argument for immortality to which the writer is unable to discover a valid answer that will accord with the law of evolution.

The phenomena of evolution suggest that the Creator has made a two-fold use of Death: first, the preservation of lower species as preliminary to producing the ultimate types; second, the unintermitting reproduction of the latter.

Considering Death as causing the preservation of species, John Fiske, in "Cosmic Philosophy," Vol. II, page 10 *et seq.*, after describing the rapidity with which plants multiply from the seed, says:

"And in similar wise it might be shown of many insects, crustaceans and fishes, that their unchecked reproduction could not long go on without requiring the assimilation of a greater quantity of matter than is contained in the whole solar system. . . . A single codfish has been known to lay six million eggs within a

year. If these eggs were all to become adult codfishes, and the multiplication were to continue at this rate for three or four years, the ocean would not afford room for the species."

Many species of animals, notwithstanding the potency of Death in preserving them, have occupied the planet for a time and then disappeared. Why did they come, and why are they extinct? No one can study well such portion of the history of evolution as is known, without conceiving that there has been a mysterious biological alchemy whereby higher forms of animal life have been developed from, or because of, lower ones. Progress from lower to higher forms of mentality has been the order in the animal kingdom; we have sufficient means of comparing animal life with that of long past ages to convince us of this fact. The evolution of Man has occupied a period of time unknown, but certainly very long. Fiske's illustration, above quoted, makes it obvious that the existence of animal life upon the planet in any reproductive form would have been impossible for more than a few years if this phenomenon of death had been left to do its work by starving the whole in one catastrophe, instead of constantly thinning the animal population by taking off those individuals least adapted to environment. Hence it is obvious that without the phenome-

non, death, there could not have been that long period of animal evolution which preceded the appearance, and apparently resulted in the production, of the human race.

I have elsewhere defined "good" as that which helps, and "evil" as that which hinders, evolution. If, then, the fact that animal life has been *persistent*—continuing from generation to generation for ages—be pregnant, as I believe it is, with potentialities that affect the entire scheme of eternal progress, we cannot but see that death is an indispensable helper of evolution.

The foregoing considerations apparently lead us to regard the persistent phenomena of death and new life, and the companion phenomenon of gain in the mentality of species extinct and still existing, as having that sort of relationship to each other which the word "law" is used to signify concerning cause and effect as already explained. Without the persistency of species they could not have matured; without their maturing, higher types could not have been produced. This was the way in which God saw fit to produce mankind. Presumably it was the only possible way, as, undoubtedly, He made the best choice, and there can be but one *best* way.

Our examination of the earthly phenomena of death and life, thus far, has not enabled us

to classify either of them as apparently ultimate ends or purposes of an Intelligence, great and good enough to account for the orderly, consistent, and beneficent process of evolution. Assuming that animal life is the only life, we find no gain for the universe in destroying individuals to preserve species, inasmuch as species are only aggregations of individuals. Nor do we find any gain in destroying less intelligent life to make room for that which is more intelligent, since earth life is too transitory a thing to be of use to the individual, and therefore any evolutionary scheme having this sort of life alone as its purpose must be useless because made up of an aggregate of useless individual lives. Nevertheless, that is the only scheme suggested by Materialism, or by any system of theology which does not give the Christian answer to the riddle of life and death: *Death is an indispensable factor in our Father's method of producing and multiplying immortal lives.*

CHAPTER XIII

THE FUTURE OF THEOLOGY

For people who believe that this world is the result of Chance, or Chaos, the *fact* of evil is not *in itself* a problem, though it gives rise to problems because of its effects on communities or individuals. Evil, therefore, presents to them only questions of human expediency. It becomes a problem in itself, only when we assume a supreme, intelligent, efficient Cause. With that assumption, the existence of undeserved pain inflicted by natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tides and storms, is, perhaps, not morally explained unless we further assume that the material causes of these phenomena are both refractory and co-existent with the efficient Cause. And undeserved suffering inflicted by man upon man *may* have to be explained by assuming that the conditions which permit these evils are unavoidable by the efficient Cause in its efforts to attain some final cause, or result, good enough to justify them,¹

¹ I define the term "material cause" as the ingredient, or ingredients, of whatever nature, material or non-material, entering into the composition of a phenomenon. See ante, Chapter V.

These matters belong to theodicy or apologetics, and will be postponed to the last chapter, because any effort to explain them must, logically, begin with the question: Is there anything to be explained? In other words, is there an intelligent, efficient Cause of this world, and of events therein? Some people answer this question by an affirmation "uttered by the lips but disregarded by the mind," as John Fiske said. Others declare in substance, "I know there is a God, just because I know it," relying on their intuition, which Kant declared to be the highest authority for truth. The intellectual answers of what was once called the science of Teleology, are rejected by all philosophers and many religious thinkers. Nevertheless, there are facts not considered in the old teleologies, upon which a new and secure science may yet be founded. I designate some of these facts as follows:

- I. Hæckel's dilemma.
- II. "Directivity."
- III. Evolution's tendency toward betterment.
- IV. Super-animal traits in man.
- V. The facts disclosed by Psychical Research.
- VI. The evolution of human character.

Of course it can make no difference what name is given to this efficient, intelligent Cause,

by the people who believe in it. Words are only signs of ideas, and so long as men speak unlike languages their verbal symbols for identical ideas must differ. If the Hebrews named this Cause Yahve, the Latins Yove, the ancient Hindus Dyus, the Greeks Zeus, the Kelts Dia, the Arabs Allah, and the Teutons Gott; if one man names it "First Cause," another, "The Unknowable," and another, "God," the same idea—an over-ruling Intelligence—inheres in all these symbols, just as the same personage is meant by the Hebrew Yehoshua, the Greek Yesous and the English Jesus. No one can be an idolator, a pagan or an atheist because of the word-symbols language authorizes him to use for these ideas.

I. *Hæckel's dilemma*:—There was a time when no form of conscious life existed here—a time when this planet did not exist. It follows that first forms appeared—forms without ancestors. Their advent can have no other than one of the two explanations suggested by Hæckel—God, or spontaneous generation. He accepts the latter:² I reject it as unphilosophical, and repugnant to reason; therefore I accept the only other alternative—believe in God. I find no intellectual escape from my choice between these alternatives; Hæckel may feel the same way about spontaneous genera-

² "Riddle of the Universe," pages 257-258.

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tion. This is not an intellectual explanation for either of us, then. It is only an intellectual choice between two explanations repugnant to each other. It will, therefore, be relevant to consider the causes that give rise to these diverse preferences:

One man, seeking a solution of the riddle of the Universe, sees spread out before him its uncountable phenomena. He searches for their causes and invariably finds them in other phenomena. This uniform experience leads him to expect that no matter how often or how widely he may thereafter inquire into the causes of phenomena, he will get the same kind of answer. He continues his investigations, finds no exception to this rule, concludes that it has none, and becomes a confirmed materialist. At last he comes upon a phenomenon for which he can discover no cause. He attributes this failure to the impossibility of finding out what occurred before, and does not doubt that if the antecedent phenomenon could be ascertained, this instance, like all the others, would conform to the rule.

Another man prosecuting the same inquiry meets with the same experience, but it has a different effect on him. He constantly keeps in mind the fact that our planet has not always existed; hence, though all the phenomena investigated have been caused by other phe-

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nomena, he knows that if he could trace this class of causes back far enough he must come to *first* phenomena, and these would of necessity be exceptions to the rule. Therefore, when a phenomenon is presented for which no cause can be found, he realizes that it may be one of these exceptions. It is impossible for a man with this cast of mind to become a materialist.

When Hæckel observed what he believed to be the first forms of animal life he described them as follows:

"If we venture to lift the dark veil which covers the oldest secrets of the organic history of the earth, we must undoubtedly seek the first beginning of life among those wonderful living beings which, under the name of *Monera*, we have already pointed out as the simplest known organisms. They are at the same time the simplest conceivable organisms, for their entire body, in its fully developed and freely moving condition, consists merely of a small piece of structureless primitive slime or *plasson*, of a small piece of that extraordinarily important nitrogenous carbon compound which is now universally esteemed the most important material substratum of all the active phenomena of life."³ Upon page 47 of the same book he says, referring to

³ "The Evolution of Man," vol. ii, page 43.

these Monera: "However thoroughly we examine them with the help of the most delicate reagents and the strongest optical instruments, we yet find that all parts are completely homogeneous. These Monera are, therefore, in the strictest sense of the word organisms without organs; or even in a strictly philosophical sense they might not even be called organisms, since they possess no organs, since they are not composed of various particles. They can only be called organisms in so far as they are capable of exercising the organic phenomena of life, of nutrition, reproduction, sensation and movement."

Alfred Binet, a more careful observer than Hæckel, says:

"The scientific world argues as to whether elementary forms exist which do not contain a nucleus and which should be termed *cytodes*, as proposed by M. Hæckel. The careful observation of micro-organisms by means of perfected technical processes has enabled us to discover hundreds of nuclei in the very cellules which M. Hæckel classed among the *cytodes*. The Monera, a group of micro-organisms believed to have no nucleus, grow numerically less and less in proportion as they are more carefully studied."⁴

⁴ "The Psychic Life of Micro-organisms," page 112. Religion of Science Library, No. 6.

Binet goes on to say that many of these micro-organisms, more especially bacteria, are so diminutive that it cannot be determined whether or not they, or some of them, are without a nucleus; hence Monera—*cytodes*—formed as Hæckel thought he had found them, *may* exist. No one absolutely knows; perhaps no one ever will know, as to that.

No settlement of this scientific dispute can relieve us from the necessity of taking one horn or the other of Hæckel's dilemma. If the actual first forms of conscious life have not to a certainty been found, they do, or did, exist, and we must account for them by one of the two suggested causes,—God or spontaneous generation. It is self-evident that Hæckel is right in saying "to reject abiogenesis is to admit a miracle." But, whatever becomes of this dispute between him and Binet, it is a fact that M. Balbiani produced the very thing described by Hæckel—"A small piece of structureless, primitive slime or plasson, all parts completely homogeneous . . . the simplest conceivable organism . . . an organism without organs." This he did by cutting from the bodies of large micro-organisms, slices which contained no part of the nucleus. These fragments continued to live from four to eight days, perceived sensations and responded thereto intelligently. "The fragments continued to move

in the same direction in which they would have moved if they were placed together to form a complete individual.”⁵ One might say that they kept on “following their nose” even after they had lost it. As soon as they were severed from the nucleus they lost the property of reproduction and regeneration, but remained able to select and take in their favorite food, though it was doubtful whether they digested it.

Which is the controlling factor in such a fragment of protoplasm: its life, its mind, or the structureless material body that gives to these a temporary abode? The reservoir from which the body comes is known; analyzed, it is found to be composed of common chemical elements. But where and what is the reservoir from which the life and mind came? These questions, I believe, can never be solved by an answer which does not include God as one of the factors.

II. *Directivity*. What I mean by this word will be found in an article by Professor Henslow in Hibbert's Journal for October, 1907, page 149. The word was coined by an English chemist to represent that factor, whatever it may be, which enables nature to do uniformly and unerringly things which laboratory experience has proved to be impossible

⁵ Binet, “Psychic Life of Micro-organisms,” page. 98.

without the chemist's *intelligence*. Professor Henslow extends the use of the term to many similar mysteries in plant and animal life, evolution in accord with changes of environment, and other facts in nature. It is not practicable for me, here, to give more than this brief hint of his argument.

III. *The tendency of Evolution toward betterment.* Without becoming involved in any dispute between old and new cosmogonies, I may feel sure of assent to the proposition that, whether our planet was ever a molten mass or not, there must have been a very long period during which vegetable or animal forms of life could not have existed here had they been introduced. *A change for the better has taken place.*

Pessimism points to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, cyclones, tornadoes, tidal waves, destructive storms, insect disease-carriers, bacteria, human want and suffering, as evidences that if there is a God He does not love us. Men become pessimists because they are tender, humane, sympathetic, and narrow-minded, like Ingersoll who said, "An Almighty Friend who cares nothing for us, who allows us to be stricken by his lightning, frozen by his winter, starved by his famine, is a friend I do not care to have." Optimists see these evils, too, but they are chiefly impressed by their gradual

disappearance. Abnormal disturbances of material nature are much less frequent and far milder than Geology proves them to have been in past ages; famines, frosts, mosquitoes, flies and bacteria, are becoming less dangerous because by using our minds we are finding out how to guard ourselves against them.

Pessimism supports itself by contrasting *present* ideals with existing conditions. The optimist, with deeper insight, compares present with past conditions, and the ideals of olden times with their achievement as facts to-day. Ideals develop slowly into actual conditions, and human experience throughout history teaches us to labor untiringly for reform, assured that, as many ideals of ancient times have borne the fruit of realization, so the higher ideals of the present age will come to fruition by and by.

The pessimist sees poor-houses, with their pauper tenants, and pronounces them evils. The optimist sees a constant improvement in social ideals and movements, presaging a better day when pauperism shall disappear and poor-houses be no longer needed.

The pessimist points to war and its attendant horrors, the optimist to the modern amelioration of war's evils, the Red Cross Society, and the rapid growth of a new hope—Universal Peace. The pessimist accuses God for the evils

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that exist; the optimist thanks God that piracy, slavery, dungeons, polygamy, despotism, the sack of cities, the slaughter of prisoners of war and non-combatants, with other crying evils that once disgraced mankind, have disappeared from civilization forever. Judging the future by the past, he expects this process of betterment to continue.

The pessimist blames God because He did not make men perfect. The optimist should thank God for human imperfection, because to be perfect is merely to be as good as it is possible for a type to become. The lower animals are perfect, of their types. The capacity to grow, to improve constantly, necessarily involves imperfection, but is a much greater blessing than perfection. Evolution has finished its work upon the lower animals; it has begun upon the human mind. Perfection is the ending of growth, and perfect beings are therefore unfit for immortality in a scheme of Progress.

If this tendency toward betterment comprehended only one thing, it might be explained by a chance direction conserved by the law of inertia. But what we see is an all-inclusive phenomenon of improvement made up of countless minor tendencies, each of which requires explanation. My reason forbids me to think that Chaos can be thus methodical, or that these multifarious tendencies all chanced to

be turned in one direction. Only Intelligence could do that; only Love could choose betterment as the direction of all those changes which are taking place in human affairs.

IV. *Super-animal traits in man.* Man possesses desires that have no relation to his animal well-being. When Jesus instructed his disciples not to be over anxious, saying, "What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed?" but to seek *first* their Heavenly Father's Kingdom and His righteousness, he was not attempting to create in them a new desire; he was appealing to a desire which had dwelt in the hearts of men so long that its beginning is lost in the mists beyond tradition. He did not ignore these bodily needs; He knew they would not be neglected by men, and that if we seek the higher things of spiritual life, we shall also find ample time to work for food, raiment and shelter; they will be "added unto" us, not miraculously, but by our own efforts.

When and why did men begin that study of the stars which, through untiring and persistent effort, has become the wonderful and growing science of Astronomy? The *when* of its beginning antedates tradition; the *why* of it was surely not food, raiment, shelter or any other animal need. These, and other wide-spread human efforts, have nothing whatever to do

with adapting us to our material environment. Are they, then, exceptions to the law of evolution, or is there an environment not material which explains them?

All human effort is born of desire, and desire is born of need. This is not to say that desire and effort always conform to need; to do that, they must be supplemented by understanding, and this is derived from intuition and experience. Are these super-animal desires and efforts exceptions to the law? Consider the two above referred to—Religion and Astronomy; they appear to be within the law, inasmuch as they are changing—growing toward betterment. I am aware that as to Religion this will be denied by the majority of my brother Christians because they regard true religion as a crystallized thing revealed in perfection and to be guarded against change. Yet it has changed and will continue to do so while the human mind and its ideals continue to grow, for growth is change. Conservators of the old religion cannot prevent this, because religion must always be a human effort to evolve a right conception of a Ruler of the universe; and the ability to form such a conception is limited by the finite, but changing and growing, human mind. Conceptions of God must of necessity include our duties—the things which, for the time being, we are able

to conceive that He wants us to do—our religious ideals. And these ideals, like others, are measured by our changing, growing wisdom. The ideals of Jesus differed materially from what was “said to them of old times,” as he took pains to point out to his disciples.⁶ Yet he admitted the utility of the old religion, in its day, for he said, “I am not come to destroy the Law and the prophets, but to fulfill them.” Recognizing that religion is a growing phenomenon, and that the way to fulfill anything of that kind is to keep it growing, he fulfilled the religion of old by adding to its growth, giving us new and higher ideals—so high that it may require many more centuries of human growth to mature them into actual conditions of common, every-day religious life.

And so, if we have changed and are changing; if we do less psalm singing, preach shorter and different sermons, and make prayers unlike those of a few generations ago, and if these changes in our devotional methods should cause some well meaning, pious people, looking upon the archangel of the Church militant as he is garbed to-day, to think him unlike some old memory, and fear that he is an impostor, let them take heart and be assured he is the same spiritual warrior who inspired their childhood.

⁶ Matthew, Chapter V.

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His armor is better and brighter, his weapons are improved, he has grown stronger and more mature; in these respects he does not look the same, but he carries the old banner and gives us the ancient familiar battle cry—"God, and what He wants us to do," as he leads against the hosts of evil. Let us press on to victory with him as our fathers did, as our children will.

Whatever changes may occur in Religion's ideals, forms, or expressions, it is always the same ever-living, persistent inspiration and desire that once manifested itself as fetichism, afterwards in the idea of God-kings, cruel, arbitrary and fickle, like human kings, as in the anthropomorphism of the old Jewish monotheism and Gentile polytheism—later, in that simple theism, the Fatherhood of God, taught by the great Savior of religion. It is a desire so old, so constant in the past, so strong and vigorous now, that it must be accounted for like all growing human movements, as a child of evolution; and this cannot be without assuming a spiritual need responsive to a spiritual environment. From this explanation of the religious *fact* there appears to be no intellectual escape.

I think W. W. Savage was the first to argue complete justification of the Christian belief in God and human immortality, from the

analogies of evolution. His argument is the closing chapter of his brother, Rev. M. J. Savage's, book, "Belief in God." I quite agree with Dr. Savage when he says in his preface, concerning his brother's essay, that he "believes its method to be new, its treatment fresh, and its argument unanswerable."⁷

Neither Darwin nor Wallace was responsible for the opinion to which their researches led many improvident thinkers. Theologians contemplated with horror the law of natural selection, as subverting religion. Materialists, for the same reason, welcomed it. Both were mistaken. Herbert Spencer, dealing only with obvious facts, proved that the Law of Evolution is universal, and religious thinkers are beginning to see in that discovery the fulfillment, through growth, of man's age-long effort to understand the Creator's plan.

V. *The facts disclosed by Psychological Research.* These facts are so numerous, so various, and so new to science, that even a thorough presentation of them (which requires many volumes) does not lead, as yet, to an absolute conviction that they prove the existence of what John Fiske called "the undying human soul." The attitude toward these facts, of a majority of the able scientists who are engaged in studying them, has always been

⁷ Published by Geo. H. Ellis, Boston.

a tentative one, developing more and more, as their work progresses, into a stronger hope that the outcome will be the same kind of proof of immortality that we have of scientific conclusions accepted by the world as truths. This is the attitude of the majority. Nevertheless several of these scientists acknowledge that they are already convinced.

VI. *The evolution of Human Character.* Accepting, whether through reason or from intuition, belief that a supreme Being has planned and is carrying out a universal movement toward betterment, His work and ways manifest such surpassing wisdom that I cannot conceive His ultimate design as less than the production of immortal intelligences upon such planets as the one we inhabit: beings whose betterment shall not be lost by ending their existence. To such a Creator our ephemeral life here would be mere child's play unless it is an unavoidable step toward that: the only *permanent* result. To quote what the present writer has said elsewhere, "Destiny is evolution; evolution is trend; trend is infinite. Destiny therefore comprehends an infinite number of finite conditions; it is the new ever replacing the old; it was, it is, it is to be; it came ages ago; it comes to-day; it is in the future, waiting. Every milestone on the endless thoroughfare of Time is Destiny. Do these mile-

stones belong to man? Or is he only one of them?"⁸ Apparently, this question is answered by the fact that evolution of the planet, and of animal forms upon it, is practically ended. No changes, except from collision with other celestial bodies, can come in earthly environment during the next few millions of years that will anywhere produce atmospherical, meteorological or other terrestrial conditions appreciably different from those which already exist upon some elevated plains where men are now living. Further evolution, if it comes, must do its work upon minds. It can succeed only with minds pliable, educable, susceptible of change, growth, improvement. Such, therefore, must be the class of minds designed by the Creator for immortality. And such is the mind of man. The type fitted for immortality has been evolved. The ages-long task of producing it is finished.

I have done little more than attempt to indicate directions in which we may seek a new and better Teleology, as we continue that task which the apostle Paul declared to be imposed by the Creator upon all human kind,—“That they should seek God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him.” And if haply they do not find Him it is the usual experience, for a while, of all searchers for anything; and the remedy

⁸ “Finite and Infinite,” Chapter I.

for failure is to try again, and keep trying. We shall find out more and more about Him, because a search so long continued, and God-imposed, will never be given up. Paul was right in this, but inherited an old error when he declared, "His ways are past finding out." If God is responsible for evolution, surely one great way of His with the human race, and each member of it, manifestly is to launch us into this world lowly and ignorant, but with a desire for knowledge, and mental equipment potentially sufficient for carrying on our search for it in Religion and all other fields of inquiry.

I have said all that need be said here of the extreme conservatists in religion—those who set up some standard of authority, as a book, or a clerical chief, and believe, or think they believe, the standard infallible. This species of religionist abounds in Christian, Moham-medan, and other lands. Another quite large, and more interesting class, I have only mentioned—those who rely upon their intuition for belief in God. They tell us that the only way is to "get religion." This class is not likely to be interested in the search for a scientific theology. Having found God in their own way, they are contented. There is another class which, on account of trained intellect and ripe judgment, has great influence. It is destined to be a more

important factor in future evolution than either of the two above mentioned, for the reason that it is rapidly increasing, while they are diminishing in numbers. This class of religionists is also "feeling after Him, if haply they may find Him," *through intellectual effort*. I have wondered *why* and *how* these people are barred, as they seem to be, from making use of the intuitional methods? There is a popular proverb of recent invention—"God helps those who help themselves." Does He help these intellectual searchers who are helping themselves as best they can? At least, He does not give them the kind of help extended to those who "get religion." Religion is not "on tap" for them. I am as far as possible from denying that the Intuitionists (if I may so call them) often do receive from God a precious religious gift; all intuition comes from Him. Such a radical, complete and abiding change as took place in the mind of Paul, and similar phenomena witnessed quite often at religious revivals, can be accounted for only through the awakening of a dormant intuition. Why is this way closed to some earnest seekers after God?

If Jesus were to reappear among us now, perhaps he would say concerning this modern proverb above mentioned, as he used to say of

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some things in the Old Testament, "Ye have heard it said that God helps those who help themselves; but I say unto you that your Heavenly Father helps only those who are unable to help themselves; those whom He has made able to help themselves need no further help." Would not that be a reasonable statement? And it suggests that by a growing capacity to find God intellectually we can diminish or render dormant our power to do this intuitionally. Many instances of phenomena similar to this have been discovered, or observed, in the animal kingdom—the loss of a power, faculty or organ, once needed, but which on account of further evolution becomes unnecessary. I more than suspect that religious evolution is tending constantly toward a higher intellectual plane, for I believe what Jesus taught in the parable of the sower: "That seed which was sown upon good ground, this is he who heareth the word *and understandeth it.*" Even intuition is profitless without understanding. And if a truth is received through the understanding, must not one's understanding of it be the clearer and better for that? Intuition, to be sure, covers an enormous range of self-evident truth. Kant declared it to be the only source of "*absolute*" truth—an abstraction quite useless to evolving humanity.

However, I have not cited it in order to quarrel with a confusing adjective, but for the purpose of adding a statement of my own: Intuition gives us the truth that Right and Wrong are unlike, but without understanding we cannot tell which is which. To this fact persecutions, wars, and martyrdoms, innumerable, make religious history a witness.

Looking at the trend of events from this standpoint, my hope for the religious future of mankind is a scientific theology which shall transform religion into an all-inclusive philosophy, embracing the present life, the future life, brotherhood eternal, and God's works and ways so far as growing experience shall disclose them; a theology that will convince the intellect and thereby awaken to completer fruition in the minds of men the divine seeds of Faith, Hope and Love. Such a theology is becoming more and more a pressing need as the number increases of those whom nothing less will fully satisfy, or cheer. These earnest searchers after God are knocking at the gate of religious truth, and though it does not open they patiently knock, believing that at last it will. Often they knock until Death opens the gate, revealing the light beyond. Persistent human efforts have ever been rewarded by success; and these eager and faithful searchers for God, striving patiently, constantly, with-

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out fainting—hoping gloriously against disappointment—will also achieve in a new and better theology the scientific revelation of Him whom they seek.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Ideas of God have, in the process of evolution, ranged between opposite extremes of good and evil; and so have our ideals of duty to Him, because men have wisely assumed that they ought to try to be God-like; and this was far from meaning the same thing to Samuel, declaring himself the mouth-piece of God in ordering a massacre of the Amalekites, "man and woman, infant and suckling," and to Jesus, commanding, "Be ye merciful, even as your Father in heaven is merciful." It was the same impulse—to do God's will—that inspired these opposite sayings of Samuel and Jesus; but Religion had been evolving, growing better, meantime; the religious intuition of right and wrong had been supplemented by intellectual growth, by a better understanding of which is which. Samuel did not know; Jesus did. In Samuel's time, both the command to massacre and the "Be ye merciful" might be attributed to God, because Jehovah was conceived as a King, fickle and erratic like human kings. But we are intellectually outgrowing that idea through a slow assimilation of the teaching of

Jesus, and through a study of God's works and ways, which discloses a supervision absolutely and invariably consistent, in that it constantly tends toward betterment.

It is recorded in the book of Job that Zophar, in a spirit of banter, asked the question, "Canst thou by searching find out God?" And in John's Gospel it is said, "No man hath seen God at any time." The latter statement possesses little human interest. We do not get acquainted with persons by seeing them, but by knowing what they are doing. "By their fruits ye shall know them," said Jesus, and it is a self-evident truth. By the fruits of our heavenly Father's works, then, we shall find Him.

Zophar's incredulity and Paul's exclamation, "How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out!" are both attributable to the same cause—an atmosphere of religious suggestion in which they had been mentally immersed from childhood. The garden of Eden, the Fall of Man, inherited sin and physical death as its result, were religious realities to them. Enslavement, imprisonment, bodily injury, destruction of property, sickness, accident, misfortune, storm, lightning, earthquakes, wars, persecutions, assaults, suffering, pain, were each and all judgments, directly and purposely executed by a despotic Je-

hovah, governing without law. These judgments were sometimes apparently just, usually inscrutable, and often clearly unmerited. Such was the small, half-truth world to which Paul's early training confined his conceptions.

It was the unavoidable evils, accidents and misfortunes, that puzzled these ancient teachers; and inheritance of their errors has kept religious people repeating to this day that cry of a bewildered mind, "How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out!" But modern thinkers are asking a larger question: "Why did not the Creator produce a world in which evil would be impossible—a world in which all men would do right and from which, therefore, even merited penalty would be excluded?"

What is Evil? In its largest sense, I would define or describe it as embracing all things that hinder or delay evolution; of necessity I should define "Good" as that which assists evolution. This, I think, would be the Creator's view of them, because, indisputably, evolution is a universal law and is, therefore, His great, fundamental plan. As pertaining to this definition I would add that, since evolution consistently tends toward the betterment and increasing happiness of mankind, this fact must be acknowledged as proof of Divine Love, and therefore any phenomenon that decreases hap-

piness, imposes unprofitable suffering, or hinders or delays improvement in human conditions, is opposed to this general Divine plan—evolution—and is, therefore, evil. I am aware that there will be dissent as to calling some events evil that would come within this definition; also, that reverence for God prevents some people from calling anything evil. They believe that nothing can occur except through the direct purposeful intervention of the Creator. But I am not here engaged with abstractions. Certain phenomena happen, which, because they delay or destroy happiness or inflict unserviceable pain, are commonly called evils. They are facts; they hurt us; and our Father dislikes to have us suffer; therefore I think that, whatever we may choose to call them, or think about them, God would surely regard them as evils. Why, then, does He permit them to occur?

As an answer to this question I submit the following propositions:

First: God would not cause or permit unuseful or injurious phenomena if they could be dispensed with in carrying out His designs. He accomplishes His purposes through Evolution. It is the best way.

Second: Phenomena of evolution may be classed under the following heads:

A. Instrumentalities: *steps toward pur-*

poses. Examples of this class: chemical changes occurring during the evolution of our planet; meteorological changes in its atmosphere; extinct animals; human efforts to outgrow ignorance.

B. *Purposes:* Examples of this class: this planet, Man, Religion, Art, Science, Philosophy, Society, Happiness, Progress.

C. *By-products of Evolution:* These are neither purposes nor purposeful; nevertheless they are unavoidable in the evolution of the other two kinds of phenomena. Examples of this class: *a*, earthquakes, storms, tides, volcanic eruptions, and all other *collateral* incidents of the chemical changes, combinations, and gravitative force necessary to the planet's evolution; *b*, collateral moral incidents of the unavoidable clash between Inertia and Evolution, e.g., religious persecutions, martyrdoms, war, famine, pestilence, poverty, crime; in short, all evils that the inertia of ignorance conserves against the tendency of Evolution to remove them.

Third: There are eternal, self-existent, infinite realities: namely, God, Space, Time, and Matter. For the purposes of the present inquiry it makes no difference whether we add Life, Mind and Spirit to this list, or consider them as infinitely included in or derived from God.

Fourth: There are couples of antagonistic *Potentials*, which depend upon each other for existence, and which have been co-existent with God, eternally—such as Truth and Falsehood, Love and Hate, Good and Evil, Right and Wrong. Their existence does not depend on *manifestation*; but each factor of a couple must have potential existence; neither one *will be* unless the other *could be*. To illustrate: Conceive it as impossible for A to do wrong; we may then conceive him as doing good without doing right; but if he *can* do wrong, then each time he does good he also does right.

Fifth: There are *pseudo* antitheses one of which cannot be manifested, such as Possible and Impossible, Something and Nothing, Time and Neverness.¹

Sixth: Growth and Perfection are potentialities that cannot co-exist in one phenomenon; therefore Perfection is impossible to any being who possesses the potentiality of eternal growth.

Seventh: "First Cause" is a temporally finite conception which cannot represent Eternal Cause.

Eighth: The following laws, or truths, are co-existent with God:

1. Like causes and conditions must result alike.

¹ Coined by Bishop Wilkins.

2. There is only one *best* way.

3. The Finite is identical in its nature with the Infinite, from which it has been segregated or individualized.

4. Difference cannot be altered to Identity, nor Identity to Difference.

5. Purpose is impossible in the absence of Difficulty; Achievement is, therefore, the overcoming of Difficulty.

Ninth: God does not permit, create or cause any law, force, reality or potentiality which is co-existent with Himself. Therefore He does not permit, cause or create phenomena which are the inevitable collateral results of evolution working with and upon self-existent laws, forces, realities and potentialities.

Tenth: Free will permits a higher evolution than is possible without it.

Eleventh: A harmonious conception of God is found in the words of Jesus, "My Father *worketh* even until now." It is a dualistic conception of the Universe because it embraces God and Difficulty, Evolution and Inertia. It agrees with the fact of delay in the universal movement toward betterment, and with the fact that this general movement embraces lesser and transient ones, some of which are retrograde.

Twelfth: A necessary conception of Divine Power inheres in these words of Jesus: "With

God all things are possible." But, by "things" is meant realities, not nonentities or absurdities—such as changing nothing into something; and by "possible" is meant not nowhere, or in no time, or *form*, or *way*, but with the use of such portions of Time and Space as the temporal difficulty of the task or its spatial limits make necessary, and hindered by such limitations as are co-existent with Himself. We are too apt to lay aside our common sense when we think about religious questions, though we never have more need for it than then. I have in mind an anecdote that illustrates this failing. Farmers A and B had obtained their religious views in childhood, through suggestion. A was satisfied; B had doubts. They conversed together as follows:

B. "Do you reckon, neighbor A, that God could make a two-year-old colt in a minute?"

A. "Yes, I reckon He could make a full-sized horse in less'n no time."

B. "But would it be two years old?"

A. "Wall, ahem, I guess not."

B. "Do you think He could double the size of this farm of your'n without takin' in any of the neighbor's land?"

A. "I reckon He could, by standin' it on end."

A rough block of marble is brought to a

sculptor. He works upon it and produces a masterpiece. We visit his studio and spend our time, while there, admiring the artist's production, paying no heed to the by-products of his labor—the chips and dust strewn over the floor. Let us practice that same common sense concerning the by-products of Evolution. We are obliged to think of them, but let us think of them as unavoidable incidents, not as purposes. Let us remember that even infinite Wisdom and Power cannot change the impossible into the possible, and therefore cannot change chemical elements into a planet composed of solids and fluids without imprisoning the forces that, by their resistance to this process, cause earthquakes, eruptions, tides, and storms. Fiske apprehended what I believe to be a sound philosophical conclusion—that actual moral evil, in altered forms, and in lessening degree, must always co-exist with evolving humanity. I only object to the theodicy by which he explains this. The *reason why* actual evil is inseparable from evolution is the all-important question.

The evils incidental to the evolution of knowledge, religion, morals and society, are not so readily disposed of as those which have been classed as "material" or "natural" evils.² John Fiske attempted to explain them upon

² "Through Nature to God," Chapter VI.

the broad ground that "without the element of antagonism there could be no consciousness, and therefore no world. . . . We cannot know anything whatever except as contrasted with something else. . . . It follows that without knowing that which is morally evil we could not possibly recognize that which is morally good." This is all true; but Fiske's conclusion that "in a sinless world the moral element would be lacking, and goodness would have no significance" does not follow from his premises. It is necessary to *know* evil in order to know good; but it is not necessary to *do* evil in order to *know* it. If we know good, we know evil perforce, without doing it. Potential evil is necessary in the world; *actual* evil is not. Potential consciousness must precede experience; without it experience could not be; once there were *first* conscious beings on this earth, and whatever they were, however low in the scale, they possessed consciousness when they arrived, but they had to wait for experience.

"In a happy world there must be sorrow and pain," concludes Fiske. In the happiest possible world there would be neither, I think, otherwise than potentially. It is true that the ability to distinguish pain as an unpleasant experience is necessary to the capacity of recognizing and enjoying physical pleasure, and *vice versa*. But this skill is not derived from ex-

perience. It is a God-given intuition; the newborn baby can prove to anyone that it recognizes pain as painful and pleasure as pleasurable. It knows more than that they are unlike. It knows the meaning of the unlikeness. *The truth is that experience dulls, and the lack of it sharpens, pain.*

It is not necessary to rob or be robbed in order to know that it is blessed to give. We have innate intuitions; one of them informs us, when we do a kindly act, that the opposite action is possible; another tells us, when we speak the truth, that we could have told a lie instead. Thus we *know* evil intuitively, without doing it. And it is good to know evil, since there is no other means of avoiding it. This knowledge we could possess in a world where evil was not done, and more certainly than in a sinful world. Experience proves this: the more people are steeped in sin, the less able they become to feel its sinfulness; people lose sensitiveness about vices that become common where they live; brutal or cruel shows and exhibitions blunt our sympathies; war, lawlessness, railroad smash-ups, mining catastrophes and other careless slaughterings of men, cheapen human life in public estimation. Therefore, is it not the reverse of truth that "in a sinless world goodness would have no significance?" Goodness can never have in-

creased significance in human consciousness except as sin becomes extinct, inasmuch as conscience is dulled by sin.

The undoubted decline of "natural" evil during the geologic period, and of moral evil during the historic period, proves that they are antagonistic to the trend of events. To all who believe in an overruling God, these facts furnish incontrovertible evidence that He is the enemy of all forms of evil. The decrease of "natural" evil has been astounding,—so great that what still exists is the veriest trifle compared with what was once common upon the planet. As moral evil came into the world after the waning of natural evil to almost nothing compared with what it had been, little time, comparatively, has elapsed for its decrease; nevertheless, its decline has been so great that no careful student of history can fail to observe it.

Moral evil is beyond comparison the most destructive of all, to life, liberty and property. It germinates wholly from Ignorance, which produces war, pestilence, famine, poverty, and all its other sad results. Though conserved through Inertia, this class of evils are gradually being overcome by evolution, and as evolution never ceases until its work is finished, the only outcome thinkable is that sin will either finally disappear altogether or (as John Fiske

believed) "decline eternally through a constantly rising standard of virtue and morality." I agree with Fiske as to this. But in either case, the process will mean a removal of moral evil from the realm of activity to that of mere potentiality. Instead of expecting a corresponding decline in human character during this process, the reverse alone is conceivable, inasmuch as experience and observation teach us that the practice of anything—be it vice or virtue—strengthens the propensity, while disuse leads inevitably to atrophy and decay of any faculty, genius, habit or skill, physical, mental or spiritual.

Reasoning in this wise, I find no intellectual mode of escape from the conclusion that real evil—i.e., active evil as distinguished from the mere capacity to do evil, is not only unnecessary to the existence of good in the world, but that goodness and virtue would flourish all the more luxuriantly without it. Hence there is no foundation in religion or philosophy for a theodicy that excuses Evil on the ground of its being necessary to the existence of Good or the upbuilding of human character, and that for these purposes God causes it to come into the world.

Good and Evil are eternal potentials. They have always been possible. The goodness of our *all-powerful* Father cannot be conceived as

a *paradox*—that He *cannot* do evil, the fact that He does not desire to do it and will therefore never choose to do it, is the best evidence we have, or can have, of His goodness. But evil in its merely potential state is good for mankind, since the temptation which its opportunity affords is to be resisted, and thereby character is ennobled and made strong. This being evident, we must explain the change from potential evil as it exists with God, to actual evil as it exists among men, in some other way than as the act of God, since it is clear that actual evil can never have been, and never can be, of benefit either to God or man.

I have made that task of explanation much more difficult than it would be if we accept the easy theodicy of that American philosopher of whom we all are justly proud, the great and good Fiske. But if we are to follow Huxley's sage and kindly advice, and "sit down before a fact like a little child, prepared to follow humbly wherever it may lead," we must first corral our fact, and make sure that it is in no wise disguised in the semblance of something else.

Characterizing Evil as anything that hinders or delays God's universal method, Evolution, moral evil is easily seen to come within this definition, since it retards the ultra-animal evolution of Mankind. God is the enemy of all

evil, both material and moral, judging from the facts that the former has almost disappeared and the latter has greatly decreased,—results which would not have been permitted if He were friendly toward evil, or had brought it into the world for some purpose approved by Him. Moreover, moral evil, having delayed His evolutionary process, must have been a constant hindrance to Him. Presumably, then, it appeared in the world, not through His act, nor with His consent, but is analagous to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tides and storms: to wit, an inevitable by-product of moral evolution. It came into the world, not as His work, but because His work necessarily introduced conditions a collateral result of which is inevitably manifested as evil.

These harmful by-products result, as already stated, from two causes: I. The impossibility that Evolution and Perfection could co-exist: II. The inevitable clash between Evolution and Inertia. Inertia is a reality in both the moral and material worlds. In imparting impulse to an idea, or halting it when once started, we encounter the same difficulty as in doing the same things with a material body. If we name this resistance "Inertia" in one case, why not in the other? The conception of ideal inertia, though unusual, is not new. Carlyle used the word in this sense. And Percival Lowell, in

his little book, "The Solar System," referring to the unscientific explanation of tides still taught in our public schools, says that this error has been kept "rolling down the ages by the inertia of Newton's great name." The greater the author of an error is, the more force its inertia has, corresponding thus to the factor of weight in the material world. Indeed, we have no other word which aptly pictures human aversion toward adopting new ideas or abandoning old ones. Mental inertia, joined with wisdom and caution, makes the true Conservatism. Alone, it possesses the potentiality of habits, good and bad, and is often manifested as blind, unreasoning stubbornness. It is always the most potent factor in procuring majorities to side with the opponents of needed reforms in church and state. Call it what we choose, it operates like the inertia of matter, and is, to all appearance, a property of both matter and mind.

We must inquire as to the efficiency of ultra-animal evolution, before searching for the way in which Inertia retards or hinders it. Assuming that the facts already referred to in previous chapters, and the argument based thereon, convince us of the Creator's ultimate design to produce, through Evolution, the highest conceivable type of finite Mind, we possess three self-evident truths which make

obvious the fundamental traits of that ideal Type:—

I. If immortal, it would be a higher type than if transient.

II. If endowed with the potentiality of eternal growth, it would be a higher type than one limited as to growth.

III. If endowed with free will—the power to choose and act in accordance with choice—it will be a higher type than one which could not do this but must manifest itself like a machine.

Since we cannot conceive the Creator as lacking power to bestow these attributes of character, nor as wasting His time upon ultimates of a transient nature, we must infer that Man possesses all of them if *he* is that ultimate. I have nothing to add to the proofs, and argument, hereinbefore set forth: that he does possess all these traits of the ideal Type.³

Moral evil appeared and still remains in the world, because it was the inevitable potential opposite of Good; because, if it were not potential, then good could not be done; because people always have, and still do, with greater or less frequency, exercise their power to do evil; and *because* this must be the case in any scheme of evolution, since evolution cannot co-exist with perfection. Moral imperfection, thus rendered inevitable in this evolving world,

³ See *ante*, Chapters vii *et seq.*, except xi.


can only be manifested through and in accordance with free will, so that evil will inevitably be sometimes chosen, either because it is knowingly preferred to the good, or ignorantly mistaken therefor. Moreover, that eternal reality, Time, and the conditions which made Death necessary as shown in Chapter xii, rendered it impossible for the Creator to bring all men into existence at the same moment, so that no one should have a temporal evolutionary advantage over others.

So far as I can see, there remains to be explained only one thing: the seeming injustice involved in the fact that people are born with different powers of resistance to the allurements of Evil. Looking at this fact from every point of view, I find nothing but immortality that can equalize these moral handicaps. To an immortal, it makes no difference how low in the scale of being he is launched into the world as compared either with any conceivable ideal or with the present caliber of his contemporaries, if he and all others are endowed with the potentiality of eternal growth, and with a free will which, according as they severally use it, can always be the means of temporarily converting the potentiality into actual change, manifested in the betterment of character,—or into its opposite—temporary disuse and consequent retrogression. Present moral and men-


tal inequalities between people still living on this Earth suggest exactly the same question as similar differences between them and people who have been living for a thousand years, and have grown proportionately. If we who live to-day possess Eternity, we cannot feel disposed to complain that we were born some thousands of years after those who once inhabited this planet, and who thus were given a considerable handicap over us in the race for personal development. What they have had time to become by now, we may become by and by, but not without effort on our part. People born in the year 3000 A. D., may overtake and pass us, if we loiter unduly. So may some of us surpass, by and by, those who are ahead of us now. Also, our Father has so constituted our minds that we derive our happiness chiefly from what we are now doing and planning to do, not from what has been already achieved by us. He has likewise given us a disposition to be entirely content with ourselves when we feel conscious of doing our best, whether it be more or less than is feasible to some other person. Best of all, He has bestowed a self-pride that makes each one prefer to be himself rather than any other. These endowments prevent us from complaining about mental or moral differences between ourselves and others, and the gift of immortality takes


from these handicaps all semblance of injustice.

Immortal children of God, placed by their loving Father in the Way that leads to Truth and expanding Life, endowed with freedom of will, with potentiality of eternal growth, with opportunity and equipment to search for and find their ideals in that ever-widening, ever-receding, ever-revealing vista of the Unknown—to them all memory of vanquished evils and vanished suffering can only exhilarate, by contrast, the joy of achieved happiness.









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